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SOME DETERMINAl~TS OF CHANGING INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
IN COLm-IBIA: 1930-1970 
A. Berry 
A. Evidence on Trends in Income Distribution from Point of Time Studies 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, despite the fact that several useful 
studies of personal and family distribution of income in Colombia have been 
carried out at various points of time, it is difficult to use them in analysis 
1of over time changes in income distribution, because of differences in method-
•-ology, different availability of data, etc. The most detailed study--by 
Urrutia and Sandoval--refers to 1964, and reports that the top five percent of 
income earners received about 28 percent and the bottom 50 percent received 
about 13-14 percent. 2 
1 see Miguel Urrutia, "Resena de los Estudios de Distribucidn de Ingresos 
en Colombia" Revista del Banco de la Republica, f/508, Febrero, 1970. 
2 see Miguel Urrutia and Clara Elsa de Sandoval, "La Distribucion de Ingresos 
Entre los Perceptores de Renta en Colombia--1964, 11 Revista del Banco de la 
Republica, Julio 1970. The validity of this study receives support from the· 
substantial similarity of the results achieved by Charles McClure in h~s study 
for the Musgrave tax commission report, using an independent methodolcgy. 
To exemplify difficulties of comparison, mention may be made of a third study, 
almost contemporaneous with the two just cited, and one which is interesting from 
a number of points of view, even though its basic objective was not to estimate an 
income distribution; it was carried out by the Ministry of Health, (se.e Ministerio 
de Salud Publica, Estudio de Recursos Humanos Para la Salud y la Educacidn Medica 
en Colombia, Bogota, Asociacion de Facultades de Medicina, 1968). A comparison 
of CEDE and Ministry of Health data for Bogota indicated to Urrutia (see Mighel 
Urrutia, "Resefia, -2.E.· cit.) that underestimation of incomes in the Ministry study 
averaged close to 40 percent. The Ministry of Health distribution suggested 
greater inequality, possibly due to heavy understating on the part of the low 
income people. \-Since the average income assumed for the Ministry's top income. 
categ0ry~(wpich was open-ended in the study itself) came from CEDE estimates, 
understating there would not influence the differences between the two. 
· ;,i..,::Hhe most recent income dist±rubution estimates (DANE, 11La Distribucion de 
:tngresos en Colombia, 11 Boletin. Mensual de Estadistica /f237, April 1971, p. 57) 
seem to be substantially comparable to the Urrutia-Sandoval urban figures, but 
appear to suffer.from a severe underestimation of agricultural and rural incomes 
(perhaps 30-40 percent) so that the distribution estimated for that sector and 
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B. The Probable Worsening of Distribution, 1930s to early 1950s: E'\Ti,..:s?.".'.l 
A quite speculative guess might be that distribution (always very bad.) 
worsened from say 1930 until perhaps some time in the early 1950s. A m1ir..1Jer 
of factors were probably working in this direction, and not fully offs~t by 
such factors as tended to operate in the opposite direction. We consider them 
in turn. 
I. The small but increasing size of the non-agricultural sector, with its 
substantially higher average income than that of agriculture.
1 As of 1945, the 
average income in agriculture was probably about 35-40 percent of that in non­
agriculture, in 1935 it was perhaps 30-35 percent. 
2 In 1964, the 2.gricult11ral 
personal income distribution had about the same degree of inequality as the urban 
Footnote 2 continued from page 1. 
for the total economy are not comparable with the 1964 figures. 
The first two attempts to rough out some information on distribut:!.i::;~ of 
income, by the World Bank mission headed by Lauchlin Currie in 1949 (Ir..tc-r.c1.3.tional 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Bases for a Development Prog::a::1 in 
Colombia, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1950 and the ECLA study (United Nations, 
Analysis and Projections of Economic Development: The Economic Develf.'r,r:i.~~-t of 
Colombia, United Nations, Geneva 1957) carried out -in the early 1950c 'bet:: ::..i::iited 
themselves to presenting average incomes for broad groups, within uh~_ch the dis­
tribution would presumably be quite skewed; as a result they are not compa:-:ahle 
with later more detailed studies. The ECLA study did report that the 4.6 pe=cent 
of families paying income tax received 40.6 percent of total income-·-tce. tc? 5 
percent of families might therefore have received 41 to 43 percent :l.:f tb:~se 
figures were accurate (see discussion in Urrutia, Resena, ~- cit., p, 181).A 
number of factors would have to be taken into account to compare suc}:-i. a. fig~1.re 
with those of the later studies, e.g., (a) when a group not specif:5.cc.lly d.0fined 
as the lf.6 percent with the highest incomes has 40.6 percent of all :i..r,co:-,10~ then 
the top 4.6 percent must earn more than the indicated percent; (b) the d:f_stribution 
is by families whereas most of the subsequent ones are by persons; (c) there was 
probably some underestimation of total income in the ECLA study. Conparison with 
the current national accounts series suggests an underestimate of at lAqst 10 per­
cent; if the income of taxpayers was correctly measured, their share of total 
income might then be about 10 percent less than suggested by the figures taken 
directly. (Of course there is plenty of doubt as to whether the tax bazed income 
data would be accurate in the first place.) 
1For a discussion of the relevance of the relative size of the two secto:.:-s 
for changes in distribution, see A. Berry, 11 Determinants General~t· r.1 ~ ~:··'::<oo en·la 
Distribucion del Ingreso Dur?nte el Proceso de Desarrollo" mimeo 197L 
2see A. Berry The Development of the Agricultural Sector in Colo~bi2, Ch. I, 
forthcoming. 
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one when unemployed persons were included in the urban labor force. 1 It is 
probable that the family distribution was more unequal in agriculture; this is 
suggested by the fact that when the unemployed were excluded from the urban labor 
force, that distribution was less unequal than the agricultural one; since evi­
dence suggests that a good share of the urban unemployed are members of relatively 
well-off families, it may be more appropriate to exclude them in making the com-
2parison.-.:, 
~the agricultural income distribution appears to have been worsening 
substantially over the period in question, whereas there is less evidence to 
that effect (see below) in the case of the non-agricultural distribution, it may 
therefore be speculated that the agricultural one was less skewed 30 or 40 years 
ago than the non-agricultural one. If this was the case, the gradually increas­
ing share of people in the non-agricultural sector would be expected to worsen 
overall distribution both because of the difference in average incomes of the two 
sectors and because of the greater inequality per se in the non-agricultural 
distribution. 
a The evidence of slower income growth for unskilled labor than for other 
groups, especially in agriculture. (This factor partially overlaps the one just 
discussed.) Between 1935 and 1968, average income per capita in agriculture probably 
rose by about 150-·175 percent while the daily wage in agriculture appears not 
to have risen at all. (In 1938 the landless or nearly landless group 
1See Albert Berry y Alfonso Padilla, 11 La Distribucion de Ingresos Pro-
venientes de la Agricultura en Colombia,1960" in DANE Boletin Mensual de 
Estadistica #234, Enero, 1971, p. XXI. The measure of inequality was the Gini 
coefficient. The urban distribution data on which the comparison is based are 
from Urrut::La and Sandoval "La Distribucion de Ingresos," op. cit. 
2;•.Appropriaten in the sense that the income distribution is being thought
of partly as a proxy for the "potential consumption" distribution. Even 
though these white collar unemployed may have no income their consumption 
may be relatively high. 
accounted for 47.5 percent of the total agricultural labor force; in 1951 it 
was 55-57 percent.)
1 Whereas income per capita rose rather systematic,:lly over 
the whole post 1935 period, wages were lower in 1950 than in 1935 (have bottomed 
out in the early 1940s); they did increase 15-25 percent over the post 1950 
period, less than income per capita but not so dramatically less. 
While wage statistics are scarce on the non-agricultural sector before the 
1950s, it appears that in manufacturing, at least during the late 1940s and 
early 503, the distribution of labor income was worsening; a comparison of the 
1945 and 1953 industrial censuses suggests that between those two years average 
blue collar wages rose by about 25 percent while average white collar wages were 
2increasing by a phenomenal 100 percent. The rapid growth of manufacturing 
during these years, and the particular focus on import substitution would be 
expected to contribute towards such a redistributive impact (see below). Such 
a comprxison (white collar vs. blue collar wages) cannot be made for the universe 
. of m.:i.nnfr.cturing firms before 1945; data from the firms reporting to DAl."\fE during 
the period 1936-194.2 (between 400 and 1,000 according to the year) suggest 
1 
This figure includes family helpers in 195l;whether it doe3 in 1938 is 
unclear but it seems probable; when they are excluded the figures are of course 
lower. Perhaps the most relevant ratio which can be derived from the census 
dat2. :i.s uobreros/ employers + independent farmers + obreros." This waG 50. 5 in 
1951 (excluding people not reporting their occupational position); the com­
parable figure for 1938 is not deducible from the census, since fa:::1ily helpers 
(assuming they are included at all) are not separated from paid workers,, If 
the family helper/paid worker ratio had been constant between th(; two years, 
the above indicator would have been about L~3 percent in 1938. Since & number 
of obreros ar2 sons who will inherit land, these ratios overestimate the per­
cent which might be thought of as a "permanently landless class. 11 Further, 
most of them have some land, so the line defining 11 landless11 and 11 ].ar.rled" is 
a r2ther arbitrary one. 
The percentages referred to for 1951 appear not to have changed 2ienifi­
cantly in subsequent years. 
? :,, .. 
·-see Albert Berry, "Trends in Real Hages in Colombian Hanufacturing and 
Construction, 11 forthcoming. :ifote that this figure does not mean thc.t ,.·~:itc 
collar earnings rose by 100 percent for a given occupation. Then: w,:,.s undoubted­
ly an upgrading of average education and training of the white collar ,~.::irl:2rs 
in this peri.od, (The number of engineers and certain other profe'.1sion2.is prob­
ably ros~ mDrkedly). Still the increase for the representative occupet~on 
must have been substantial. 
-5-
approximately a 5 percent increase in real wages for blue collar workers and a 
10 percent decrease for white collar workers. 
1 This would be cons:tstent with a 
pattern where the period of a rapidly widenine white collar-blue collar differ­
ential began after World War I. This phenomenon was, as is well known, reversed 
beginning some time in the early or mid 1950s. 
The movement of average wages of government employees (a category so hetero-
geneous 2 that it is doubtful that it can be given much interpretation) is som2-
what different (see Table 1); like that of white collar workers in manufacturing, 
it seems not to have been increasing in the years preceding the end of World 
War II; a five year moving average of wages for all levels of governme.1t rises 
moderately over the succeeding decade (1945-55) and more rapidly in the following 
years. The movements are different for the different levels of governm2nt, in 
particular the national goverrnnent wage series moves rather differently from 
those of the other two levels. 3 One interesting subgroup, the primary school 
teachers underwent real wage declines during World War II, a rough constancy 
till some time in the early 50s, then a rather rapid increase. Both this subset 
of government workers and the category as a whole probably have substaatial non­
market elements in the determination of their wages, with the res~lt that these 
1 see Ibid. 
2
It includes professionals, teachers, police, street sweepers, and & host 
of other categories. 
3The figures here probably understatethe -:.-eal increase through fa:U.'.lre to 
take adequate account of the increase in prestaciones sociales. Hoving .::.ver·­
ages are used since nominal wages tend to change in steps in the government 
sector, with the result that real wages fluctuate rather violently and p~obably 
do not reflect short run market phenomena. 
#TABLE-------------1 















































































































































Middle year of the five year period. 
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Sources and Methodology for-Table 1. 
The source for the nominal wages on which the data of this table are 
based is~ in the majority of years, the Anuario General de Estadistica. 
For years in which information could not be found in the Anuario data from 
the publication Estadisticas Fiscales y Administrativas was used. The 
published data (in both cases) gave the total wage cost and the number of 
permanent employees. Various types of bias may come from assuming that the 
ratio of these two figures measures the wage rate, as for example when in 
different years a different share of the wage bill goes to temporary workers; 
also it is true that the apparent noninclusion of fringe benefits in the 
labor cost data introduces a negative bias over time, since fringe benefits 
have been an increasing share of total remuneration. 
To convert the nominal figures to real ones the following indices were 
used; (1) 1954-63: the national white collar ~ost of living series was used 
in the case of the municipalities and departments and the corresponding 
Bogota series to deflate the national government salary series{given that 
a large part of the national government employees live in Bogota). 
(2) 1946-54: the Bogota white collar cost of living series was used (no 
national series was available over this period). (3) 1937-46: a blue collar 
Bogota cost of living series was used; not even a Bogota white collar 
series was available during this period. It is clear that the methodology 
used to convert the nominal salaries to real ones can introduce a variety 
of weaknesses in the series. 
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do not follow too closely general wage trends for people of comparable skill.1 
In the construction sector data are scarcer and more difficult to inter­
pret. Nevertheless a rather clear hypothesis emerges from a comparison of 
the scattered data on unskilled construction worker wages with the agricultural 
wage figures. (See Table 2.) It appears, over the long run, that (a) a rela­
tively close relationship has prevailed between the two series, and (b) that 
there has been a wage differential in favor of the urban (unskilled construction) 
worker;thus in the late 30s the typical daily wage of a peon in Bogota appears 
to have been 20-40 percent higher than the daily wage of peons in the agricul­
tural regions near Bogota (compare Cols. (1) and (4), Table 2. 2 
The relationship appears to have become inverted in the early 50s with 
the agricultural wage slightly higher, perhaps in part a.result of the 
violencia. The typical long run differential then reappeared in the late 50s 
and since, fluctuating between 10 and 25 percent; it appears to have narrowed 
in the last five years, perhaps due to a showdown in building, or perhaps to 
increasing efficiency of the labor market. 
Some uncertainty attaches to this interpretation due to the fact that the 
1A comparison with industrial wages suggests that an above equilibrium 
component of government employee salaries may have been rising, but serious 
consideration of this hypothesis would involve careful disaggregaticn of both 
groups. 
2udall's study of the Bogota labor market indicates that average con­
struction worker wages (not just obrero raso) rose about 23 percent during
1937-1963-4; over this period Cundinamarca agricultural wages rose 35-50 
percent and those in Boyaca by about the same amount. (See Alan Udall, 
Migration and the Labor Market> Bogota. Colombia, Yale Ph.D. dissertation in 
progress. 
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wage figures prese.nted in Col. (1) for 1935-·1942 are public sector wages, 
while the post 1950 figures refer primarily to the private sector; in any case 
these Bogota public sector unskilled construction wages bore a fairly con­
sistent relation to the Cundinamarca agricultural wages over the 1935-1942 
period; the real construction wage showed no measurable change while that in 
agriculture fell a little. 1 No figures are available between 1942 and 1950, 
but if it be assumed that the recorded public sector wages for the 1932-1942 
period corresponded to the same okill level (or more generally to the same 
labor market) as those of the 1950-1970 series (not exclusively or even pri­
marily public sector)~ then it would be concluded that the real wage fell by 
about 20 percent (from an index of 75 to one of 61) over the period. 2 (Mean-
while the Cundinamarca agricultural wage rose by 28 percent, about the same 
in cool climate regions as in ~he hot zones.) (Thus the suggested 1935-50 wage 
movement clearly fits a "worGc-n1.ng distribution11 pattern. 
Over the period 1950-71, real wages of unskilled workers rose by perhaps 
1~he.figures indicate that both unskilled construction workers and agri­
cultural workers suffered declines in real wages in the late 30s, after in­
creases in ~he ea:.ly 30s wl1en ;:>rices were falling rather rapidly, but it seems 
probable that during both these periods the market was in disequilibrium; the 
rising real wages of t,1e early 30s were probably associated with increasing
employment problems, so that in a more general sense there may have been no 
increase in real income, conversely the decrease in the measured real wage 
probably was accompanied by improved employment possibilities and is therefore 
a misleading indicator when taken by itself. 
2Deflating by the Bogota blue collar/cost of living series. 
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SO percent in Bogota, with the increase rather concentrated in tLe period 1958-
1965, Udall's figures, together with those c,f '!.'able A-1, suggest tha.t the period 
1936-1955 was one of no increase~ a pattern more extreme than that in manufac­
turing, but apparently part of a similar long run pc:ttern. 
For the country as a whole, unskilled construction ·wage .series are un-
available before 1950 .. A less close relationship between cor:struction and 
agricultural wages would be expected at the national lev2l due to different 
regional weightings fo:: the two occupations, etc., It i:=:; worth noting that the 
evidence available for the post 1950 period is ~onsistent with ci rather close 
1tie. In view of this, it seems rather unlikely that the coun-ay-wide average 
unskilled construction wage differed ma~kedly from that fo~ Logota ov0r any 
extended period, especially since the two agricu:,.:ural r17P 6e series ha,·e quite 
2parallel movements.. Consequently, it i:.1eems probably th.1t ;~_onstru·:;tio:::1 wages 
in general suffered a. decline in the 1930-50 :,)er:i..ocl as u ~•,h'Jle? or at least 
the 1935-50 period, 
For Bogota Udall's figures on wages in Cl)mmerce fit the gc.n8ral pattern 
1As of 1971 (1st semester) wage differencer:; acroE;s ci::1J!S i,:::·-:-e not dramatic 
(see Table A-2), which indicates that 7 of 10 cities sampled had average "helper" 
wages in the range 18.5-20.7 pesos per day and all hut Calt (affected by the Pan 
American Games) had average "official11 salaries betwv2n 25 and. 35 p~sos per day. 
It seems probably that regional differences 'Jere greater i:1 c-.arlt,;r years when 
geographic mobility was more limited just as agri.culturnl wag2F 7aried more by 
department in earlier years). 
2rt may be noted also, in connection with :::1tability in wage structure that 
construction workers apart from the unskilled nobrero -i:aso11 cat:egory appear to 
have received about the same extent of wage increases "1S th..'-t group; the wage 
structure in the industry therefore has not altered much c:;; leant as say, as 
can be judged by Bogota data. 
Table 2 
Unskilled Construction Wages in Bogota, Compared to Other Selected Wage Series (all wages expressed in daily terms) 
Agricul­
Agricul­ tural Unskilled 
Unskil~ed Con- Unskilled Con- tural Salaries: 
s truct1.on struction Salaries~ Cold Cli­
Workers: Workers: Cundina- mate,Cundi-
Bogo t 
0 
_a____ Country marca marcal
\. . (1) (2) (3) (4)~ . ,,,.





1938 (.94) •60 0.60 
1939 (. 96) .60 0.60 
1940 (.95) • 80 0.80 
1941 (.94) .80 0.90 
1942 (.92) 0.65 0.60 
1943 0.60 0.60 
1944 0.90 0.80 
1945 1.05 1.00 
1946 1.50 1.50 
1947 1. 75 1.50 
1948 1.85 1.70 
1949 2.05 2.00 
1950 2.2.4· 2.50 .2.30 
,. 1951 2.34 2.90 2.60 
1952 2.45 2.70 2.40 
1953 2.50 2.95 2.55 
1954 2.74 3.42 2:.90 
1955 2.93 3.67 3.25 
1956 3.98 3. 92 3.35 
1957 4.30 4.37 3.90 
1958 5.01 5.05 ~,. 50 
1959 6.00 5.25 ~,. 7 5 
1960 6.50 5.90 5.25 
1961 7. 60 6.50 5.80 
1962 8.50 7.10 6.55 
1963 10.20 9.15 8.40 
196!1 12.55 10.10 9.75 
1965 15.00 11.65 11.60 
1966 16.00 13.72 12:.60 
1967 17.00a 15.67 H.20 




















































Construction Workers struction Workers: 
Cuellar Gomez Company Ministry of Public 
Peones Helpers Works 
(7) (8) (9) 
1.30 
1.37 0.90 0.93 
1.44 1.00 0.94 
1.52 1.08 o. 96 
1.60 1.20 0.95 







Table 2 (continued) 
Agricul­
Agricul- tural
Unskilled Con- tural Salaries: Agricul­rskil~ed Con-
struction struction Salaries Cold Cli­ tural
.Jorkers: Workers: Cundina . ) mate Cundi­ Salaries:
Q3ogota Country marca marca Colombia
(1) (2) (3) (4) 7s5
Yect.r=
1969 19.00a 18.50 17.22 17.00e
1970 20.ooa
19n~'( 21. 5l 20.3b 
a. Interpolated by guessing.
b. Bogota value times .9431, estimated from Table A-2.
c. DANE, Anuario General de Estadistica, 1966·-67.
d. Interpolated (in the absence of access to the correct figure) taking into account an estimate of the change inthe real agricultural wage between 1967 and 1968.
e. DANE, Boletin Mensual de Estadistica #240, p. 32; equal weight was given to cold and hot regions.





Sources and Methodology: For the years 1950 to 1958 the series is based on unpublished data kindly suppliedby Robert Merrill; for subsequent years the lower figure of the CAMACOL series and.the ICT series was chosen.In certain years in ~hich ICT was paying the minimal wage, the CAMACOL figures were lower still and the assump­tion is that the market wage was in fact below the minimum wage at those times. In the last years the CA.MA.COLfigures have been ab:ove those of ICT and also above figures suggested by data from CEDE, DANE, and experts inthe field; for that reason we have accepted the IGT figures for 1965, 1966, and 1967. (It would be possible toverify more completely the consistentcy with the CEDE data during 1963-1966 if we knew the educational distribu­tion among the unskilled workers, but we do not.) Cols. (3) and (4) are based on DANE information published inthe Anuario General de Estadistica and/or the Boletin Mensual de Estadistica. For Col. (3) the cold and warmregions of Cundinamarca were weighted equally JLn the calculation.
Col. (5) comes from Berry, "The Development ••• " .£I:· cit., Ch. 3, through 1965. (The original sources arethe two just cited.) The specific sources for the subsequent years are cited in the footnotes.Cols. (6) to (9/ are from Table A-1. 
Table 3 
Selected Real Annual Wage Series (1958 prices) 
Construction Manufacturing_ Commerce Maids 
Food & Beverage 
Unskilled Con- Stores with 
struction Artisan Plants of Plants of Establish­ Sale of (Index: 


















1953 1067 2517 2320 
1954 1075 1900-2700 1070 
1955 1138 
1956 1463 2390 
1957 1353 
1958 1378 100 I 





1964 1793 3129 
1965 2071 
· 1966 1843 2820-3080 2800-3060 
1967 1810 2900 1680 130 
1968 1810 
1969 1735 
:If Adn less than 24,000 pesos output.
1970 1708 
Sources and Methodology: 
Col. (1) is based on the nominal wage series of Table 2, deflated to 1958 prices and assuming 275 days paid per year. 
Col. (2) is from Miguel Urrutia and Clara Elsa Villalba "El sector Artesanal en el Desarrollo Colombiano" Revista de 
Planeacion y Desarrollo, Vol. 1, #3, October 1969. 
Cols. (3) and (4) are calculations by the author, making use of John Todd's correction factors for the year 1966 (to 
offset a bias introduced by DANE's methodology in the years since 1962). See John Todd, Size of Firm and Efficiency 
in Colombian Manufacturing_, Yale Ph.D. dissertation in progress. 
Cols. (5) and (6) are based on the commerce censuses of 1954 and 1967 respectively. In Col. (5) the 1954 estimated 
range is preliminary; data are not fully comparable between t·he two censuses. The estimates of Col. (6) are from 
A. Berry "Unemployment as a Social Problem in Colombia: Some Preliminary Hypotheses and Interpretations" rnimeo, p. 98 •. 
Col. ( 7) is from Alan Udall, "Migration and the Labor Market, Bogota, Colombia" Yale Ph.D. dissertation in progress. 
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1precisely; he finds a decrease between the years 1936 and 1954 and a subsequent 
rather she.rp increase to 1963-64. 2 Maids wages in Bogota, according to Udall, 
rose rapidly over 1936-1945, fluctuated around the 1945 level till around 1950 
when a sharp dip appeare.d followed by a recovery which however only brought the 
wage up to its 1934 level around 1958, after which time a substantial percen-
3tage increase has occurred, amounting over 1958-67 period to more than 25 percent. 
Data from the 1954 and 1967 commerce censuses suggest that these wages rose, 
in some cases very substantially and perhaps overall somewhat more than either 
small finn wages in manufacturing or unskilled construction workers. Real wage 
changes in these latter two categories (over roughly the same period) were about 
20-30 percent [1953 to 1966] and 50-60 percent [1950 to 1970] respectively while 
in small scale commerce they appear to have been 20-40 percent (1954 to 1967). 
(See Table 3). 
To summarize, the information for agricultural wages, blue collar manufac­
turing w,2ge,,, c.onstruct:.ton wages, and commerce wages all show small or no in­
creases from some point in the 30s to some point in the 50s. Maids' wages in 
Bogota (the weakest series in terms of methodology) are a partial exception-­
according to Udall's figures--depending on the particular period chosen. White 
collar workers in manufacturing and government both showed moderate or rapid 
increases at least ove~ 1945-1955j suggesting a widening of the overall white 
1The 1936-54 change is open to some question both because of the small sample 
in both years and possible differences in the definition of "small," but also 
because of the fact that Udall had to assume the same ratio of average wages to 
average fncomes in the two years, the two pieces of data apparently only being 
available together in 1954. (See Udall, .2.E.· cit.). 
2For 1963-64 Udall used wage data from CEDE's unemployment surveys. 
3udall obtained an observation every 2-4 years since 1945, based on classified 
advertisement: data; although the methodology leaves room for some doubt, it is 
consistent over time. It is more doubtful that the calculated change over 1936-45 
is accurate since the sources of information were different. One might speculate 
that Alfonso Lorez' social legislation had some impact on these wages though it 
would be surprising if a noney ·'.vage series would catch much of it. 
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collar-blue collar gap.l There appear during this period to have bee~ a labor 
surplus phenomenon in a number of sectors with the corresponding downw~rd impact 
on wages. As already seen in the above discussion, this is in contrast to the 
events of a subsequent period (beginning some time in the early 50s and extending 
to some time in the early or mid 60s, according to the sector) during which the 
blue collar wages rose rapidly and white collar-blue collar gaps wGre narrowed. 
This period is discussed in more detail below. 
Though empirical information on capital incomes is scarce, theory and some 
observation would suggest that the import substitution policy begun in the 30s, 
but reaching substantial proportions especially after the war, raised these in­
comes in manufacturing (and commercial agriculture to some extent) ar.d led to 
greater inequality of tae distribution of labor incomes. As just discussed, this 
latter phenomenon showed up, for example, in the increasing ratio of white collar 
to blue collar incomes in manufacturing after World War II; the import substitu­
tion policy was probably one factor working in this direction. Info:rr:iat:Lon on 
the capital share is shaky. In manufacturing it appears not to have ch.:mged much 
between 1944-45 and 1953; in 1953 the labor share of gross value addcci (at factor 
cost) appeared to be a little over 30 percent (28. 7 percent using DANE' s 1.:pward 
biased value added figures--not all of purchased import was subtracted out in 
DAJ."\JE's calculations of value added); a rough estimate based on data kindly made 
available by David Chu suggested a not very different labor share in 1944-45. 2 
In agriculture an increase does appear to have occurred (the labor share seerns 
clearly to have been falling) though it is unclear how much of it was associated 
with import substitution. 
c. Possible Improvements in Distribution Since the Early Fifties 
Since some time in the 50s while conclusions as to which way distrilr1tion 
1
The fact that white collar workers were (and are) a minority of the total 
labor forcej but a growing one, would lead one to expect this increasing inequality 
(e.g., in terms o± the Gini coefficient) even in the ratio "white collar/wage/blue 
collar wage;; did not rise; the same reasoning is involved as explained in the 
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(Footnotes continued from previous page) 
context of the agriculture to non-agriculture structural shift over time and 
its impact.
2Import substitution was occurring during the war as well as after it--
in the former period it was a result of the restrictions on world trade 
associated with the conflict. One might not therefore have predicted any 
increase in the capital share in industry during this period but rather over 
say 1935-1950. Further, it must be noted that the overall capital share 
increasing impact of import substitution might have occurred primarily 
through changes in the relative size of different sectors, e.g., a decrease 
in relative importance of agriculture (which had at that time a relatively 
high labor share) and an increase in that of industry. 
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has been shifting remain speculative, the weight of evidence would appear to suggest
an improvement. Factors probably working toward equalization (of one sort or 
other) are:
(i) the spread of primary educatio~ (very much associated with the phenone-
non of urbanization). Hhereas in 1936.pirobably less than 40 .percent of the 7-11 age 
g...""-E>up~waG attending school, by .19~0 this ratio reached 47-52 percent and by 1968 
On the other hand the spread of university education, and secondary as well, 
would be expected to have, on balance, inequality increasing effects; the GiiH 
coefficient of the number of years of education changed--from about in 1938 
to 0,59in 1951 and to 0.84 in 1964 (for men 15-59 years). It is not true of 
course, that a year of education has the same income increasing effect regardless 
of the level. Table A-4 shows for Bogota (1966) how salaries of men varied with 
educational level and age; taking a rough average age, one observes that the 
average year of university raises the ho~rly wage by 1.70 pesos, that of second­
ary (academic) by 2.00, and that of primary by 44 centavos. The first year of 
primary raises income by 50 centavos. It is .clear, then~ that a year of educa­
tion is worth more at the secondary and university levels than the primary. 1 
At the same time the percent increase in income effected by a one year increase 
at each level is 
To Primary 1: about 25 percent 
To Primary 5: about 120 percent over 5 years or a geometric average
of about 17 percent 
Primary.. 5 fo
Secondary 6: about 290 percent (less for people under 30), a
geometric average of about 25 percent 
Secondary 6 to
__!}Il~Y-~rsit_y _5-§_:_ ab_out 60 perceJit_ (less for people over 35) or .a geo- - - -
metric average of about 9 percent per year. 
1The differentials just quoted could be different after appropriate normali­
z.qtion for a~e and other relevant factors, but probably not greatly so •..~,:- ..·:t.~:~•~·~·r, 1 .:.~n!... t~ .•1···- • 
-16-
If everyone's education in years were to increase by the same percent between two 
points of time, (except for the highest education category, complete university) 
the Gini coefficient of male labor income in urban areas would rise, at least 
for small or moderate percentage increases. (A 10 percent percentage increase 
would, for example, raise the Gini coefficient from .40 to .42.)1 
As observed below, the capital share increased consistently since 1950; so 
a better or even unchanging distribution of it would be expected to work towards 
improving the overall distribution. In fact the distribution of human capital 
share has probably worsened. 
(ii) Capital accumulation per se, which unless the elasticity of substitu­
tion is greater than one, may be expected to increase the labor share. (There 
is no convincing evidence~ however, that the long run elasticity of substitution 
is below one, analyses of this question are only now beginning.) 
(iii) The declin:i_ng importance of import substitution as the easier stages 
are completed, 2 so that domesdc demand and exports begin to account for a 
larger share of the output increase. 
Factors probably pushing in the other direction are: 
(i) the increasing commercialization of agriculture probably has been the 
major factor in worsening the distribution there. In this and other sectors the 
labor saving bias of technological change has doubtless tended to worsen distribution. 
1Where Bogota wage figures (as a function of amount of P.nnt";:if-;on) are applied
to the educational breakdown for the urban areas as a whole. Precisely comparable
figures are not available.
2Import substitution has, of course, moved into more and more complicated
branches of production. But the monopoly profits associated with the newer
branches ma.y be less than those associated with earlier ones; even if they were
the same, some of the earlier monopoly profit rates have probably been bid
down, and the average rate thereby decreased. Once again, this conclusion is
essentially speculative. Average age specific fertility and gross reproduction
rates for women was less than 1/2 as high where family income is 30,000 pesos
and up where it is less than 3.600 in 1965-6. (See Ministerio de Salud Publica
y Ascofame, Hechos demograficos, Table 28). Meanwhile there was evidence that
these differences had not been as wide in the past. Number of living children
was only slightly higher for the lowest income class (5.1), that the highest
(4.8); this s~all difference is presumably due in part to the higher child
de{ith rate of poorer mothers--a differential which is undoubtedly diminishing-­
and in part to the fact that the difference in age specific birth rates as a
function of income were smaller in the past than in the present. 
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(2) Widening dispersion of blue collar labor incomes in manufacturing-­
and possibly other sectors--as large size firms become more important in total 
1
output and wages paid. This increasing size phenomenon may help to maintain 
or increase the concentration of ca?ital incomes, although this is less clear. 
(3) Widening differences in family size as between wealthy and poor. 
2 By 
1965 this di£f~rence was quite substantial; it appears probable, although data 
is not readily available, that there was less dispersion of family size in 
earlier decades. This trend may be starting to reverse itself by now. 
Factors whose impact is unclear include: 
(i) The changing importance of monopoly; as noted above, the importance 
of monopoly related to the import subGtitution process may well have decreased. 
But it is less clear whether a comparable overall decrease in the "monopoly 
profit shareir of :national income has occurred. 
(ii) The changing share of income from aoset appreciation. The share of 
non-reproducible as~3ts (land especially) in total capital may have moved up or 
down and its tendency to apprecia.te may also have undergone change, but data 
1rt was observed earlier th:'.'..t the white collar-blue collar differential 
in manufacturing has decreased substantially in percentage terms, favoring 
decreasing inequality. There has probably been increasing inequality in the 
blue collar industrial labor force, and possibly in the total labor force. 
No over time estimates have as ye~ been carried out. 
2Average age specific fertility and gross reproduction rates for women was 
less than half as high where fa.mily income ucs 30,000 pPsc-s as where it was less than 
3.600 in 1965-66. (See Miniserio de Salud Publica y Ascofame, Rechos demogra-
ficos ~ Table 28.) MP.anwhile th.e:ce was evidence that these differences had not 
been as wide as in the past. Nu~ber of living children was only slightly higher 
for the lowest income class (5.1) than the highest (4.8); this small difference 
is presumably due in part to the higher child death rate of poorer mothers--a 
differential which is undoubtedly diminishing--and in part to the fact that 
the difference in age specific birth rates as a function of income were 
smaller in the past than at present. 
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1 are not adequate to ascertain such movements. 
(iii) Urbanization. At the start of the 50s (1951) something less than 
40 percent of the population was to be found in urban areas (defined as centres 
with 1,500.people or more) and even less in towns of some size. By 1,964 a little 
over 50 percent of the population was so classified and by 1970 about 56 per-
cent. 2 Since at the start of the period the distribution of income in agriculture 
was probably less uneven than that in the urban areasj and the urban population 
was smaller than the rural, migration may have had a. distribution worsening 
effect. Toward the end ."\:t ;::he period, by which time a minority of the popula­
tion was in rural areas and distribution (at least in agriculture) was worse 
3
than in the cities, the opposite might have been the case. 
D. Functional Distribution of Income Over Time 
It is easier to cor1struct historical series on functional distribution 
than on personal or family distribution, and since the two may be expected to 
bear a rather close ~elation, this is a useful exercise. The basic distinction 
usually made is between labor income and capital income--where the former in­
cludes all payments (and imputations, if the calculation is a sophisticated one) 
to labor. Within labor income i.t is often of interest to distinguish the part 
accruing to irhuman capital11 and within capital income the 11 rentier share" i.e., 
the income corresponding to the holding of assets whose management requires no 
~ote that in any case asset appreciation income is not included in the 
national accounts; the subsequent discussion of functional income therefore 
excludes it. This leads to a downward biased estimate of the capital share. 
2 see DAl.1E, Encuesta de Hogares, 1971. 
3The fact that many large income earners from agriculture have always lived 
in cities complicateo this analysis, however, since the rural distribution may 
have been better than the urban one throughout the whole period; in that case 
the distribution improving impact of migration would be more in doubt. 
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or almost no effort, and income from those whose management does require such 
effort. Another way to phrase this distinction is as between assets whose 
holders perform no social function and those whose holders do; the former might 
be called "renter income." The assets usually corresponding most closely to the 
latter concept are absentee held land, and other real estate {apartments, urban 
land, etc.). 
We turn first to a discussion of the apparent movements of the labor share. 
In the analysis of changes in income distribution over time, three "labor shares" 
are of particular interest: (a) the share of national income paid to people in 
return for their services (paid labor share); the total labor share, i.e., the 
peiS labor share plus the imputed income of the self employed corresponding to 
their labor inputs and (c) the pure labor share, i.e., the share of national in­
come corresponding to basic labor services as distinct from the additional income 
related to services which are. based on education and learned skills. Unfortunate­
ly the paid labor share is 1 from a conceptual point of view, the least inter­
esting of the measllres but it j_s the only one for whose calculation data are 
fairly readily available. That part of income which accrues as a result of holding 
capital, either physical or human, is the complement of the pure labor share, so 
in some contexts it is the most interesting labor share. But since certain insti- ~, 
tutions, such as primary universal education, may imply that the distribution of 
human wealth is less unequal than that of physical wealth, and, since in any case 
it tends to have different d~terminants, the total labor share is also of con-
siderable interest~ as the complement to the physical capital (including land) 
share. The pairl labor share is of interest primarily in that it constitutes 
a first step in the mea.furement of the other two. 
-20-
As seen in Table 4, the paid labor share of gross domestic product (at fac­
tor cost) ranged from about 32 to almost 39 percent over the period 1950-1969 
and showed a general upward trend. The share of estimated net domestic product 
(at factor cost) rose from 34.2 to 42.5 percent. 
1 While there are undoubtedly 
errors in these figures, they are probably not so serious as to throw into ques­
tion the clear increase in the paid labor share. This is especially true when 
account is taken of the fact that the indirect tax share has risen slightly 
over the period--this category never accrues either to labor·or to capital. 
Although part of the increase in the paid labor share during this period was 
associated with increases in specific sectors, in particular manufacturing, 
transportation and in smaller degree a couple of other sectors, agriculture 
(the largest single sector) showed a substantial decline so that the net effect 
of intrasectoral changes in the share was less than on8 point, (i.e., with the 
1950 sectoral distribution of value added and 1967 labor shares within each 
sector, the overall paid labor share (of G.D.P.) would have risen only from 
32.0 to about 32. 7 •), Host of the increase was associated with the intersectoral 
shifts, especially towards government, banks, etc., and construction. During 
the latter part of the period the decrease in the share of agriculture
2 also 
contributed, since by that time its labor share was well below the overall 
1As observed in the sources and methodology to Table 4, it is widely be­
lieved that the national accounts overestimate private sector depreciation, and 
by an increasing amount over time; this, by itself, would imply that these 
figures are upward biased (other data being correct) by an increasing amount; on 
the other hand, no account is taken in the national accounts of public sector 
depreciation, which could have been increasing over time. 
2In agriculture the decline in the labor share is associated with the advent 
of commercial agriculture whose share in total agricultural production (including 
livestock) rose from about 7-10 percent in 1950 to about 18-24 percent in 1967, 
(in 1958 prices), where cornmercia~ agriculture is defined as including cotton, 
rice, sugar, for refining, barley, sorghum, soybeans, sesame, 50 percent of 
wheat output and 10 percent of the production of corn and potatoes. 
'l'abie 4 
Paid Labor Share of Value Added at Factor Cost, by Sector, 1950-1969 
Year Agricul- Fishing & Silvi- Manufac- Construe- Transpor-
ture Hunting culture Mining turing tion Commerce tation Communications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1950 27.4 9.0 24.9 34.7 27.47 73.0 18.3 35.8 54.7 
1951 27.4 9.7 30.6 31.2 . 28. 3 75.5 18.3 36.2 53.7 
1952 25.7 9.8 29.2 27.5 29.5 74.1 '18. 3 35.6 50.4 
1953 26.0 9.8 30.5 31.5 30.1 73.1 18.3 37. 2 51.0 
1954 23.7 10.7 30.5 32.6 30.8 71.8 18.3 37.0 52.6 
1955 25.4 11.6 31.5 34.L 32.4 71.97 18.3 37.3 54.3 
1956 22.9 11.6 32.1 33.8 32.7 72.2 18.3 33.9 50.5 
J.957 20.9 13.8 32.9 29.6 34.0 71.2 18.3 37.3 53.7 
1958 21.6 13.7 31.l 23.3 34.8 72.0 18.3 39.0 50.7 
1959 22.0. 11.2 30.2 26. Lf 35.0 71.3 18.3 38.7 50.9 
1960 23.0 12.1 30.1 26.8 34.85 72.28 18.32 43.79 50.2 
1961 23.6 14.4 30.6 27.0 36.2 72.l 18.3 45.7 60.5 
1962 24.6 13.9 30.2 33.0 36.3 71.4 19.5 47.8 57.4 
1963 25.8 16.3 30.9 34.5 36.5 73.6 18.3 46.3 62.1 




1965 24.9 17.9 32.0 35.0 38.1 74.4 18.3 48.4 55.4 I 
1966 23.4 21.9 31.4 39.1 37.8 75.6 18.3 49.8 58.2 
1967 23.6 18.3 29.1 41.0 38.93 77.41 18.3 47.9 57.2 
1968 22.0 13.4 28.2 34.l 40 o lr•, 78.1 21.5 43.7 55.5 
1969 22.7 11.6 27.0 34.7 39.9 81.1 21.7 45.3 55.9 
.~ 
Table 4 (continued) 
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Sources and Methodology - Table Lf 
For all sectors with the exception of agriculture the figures represent the 
national accounts datum npayments of labor 11 reJ.ated to gross domestic product at 
factor cost 51 with all figures in current pesos. The labor payment figure in- -
eludes salaries, bonuses, commissions, and other forms of income in money or 
specie calculated before the deduction of personal charges for social security. 
Payments to people habitually residing in otner countries are excluded while 
those received by nationals but paid by other countries are included. Employer 
contributions to social security ::i.re included. There is no imputation for the 
labor income of self-employed. {See Banco de la Republica Cuentas Nationales 
1950-1967, p. 7. 
The national accounts figures appenr to be reasonable for most of the sec­
tors, though estimates are particularly difficult tc, effect in agriculture and 
some of the smaller sectors. The author's estimate in an independent study of 
wage shares in agriculture indicated a paid labor share of 23 percent in 1960 
as opposed to the 31.8 percent given in the national accounts. Both estimates 
have substantial elements of the arbitrary in them~ in particular estimates on 
days worked per year, etc., and they are only partially independent of each 
other. The difference, however, lies in the fact that the nutional accounts 
estimate of the total paid labor force in agriculture is higher thnn my own, 
due to their including all workers classified in the population censuses as 
working for someone else plus a portion (one-half) of the independent workers. 
While it is indeed true that many independm1t workers also earn income as 
laborers~ it seems clear on ·the other hand that some of the population classi­
fied in the census as workers hold small farms from which a part of their income 
accrues; they are not full time ·,mrkers, I assumed that these t,,ro effects off­
set each other. The Banco estimate of the paid labor share for this sector was 
thus dccrea.sed in e.s.ch year by the coefficient , 725 (thr:, ratio of my estimate 
to theirs in 1960). Since occupational struct:ure hes changed little over the 
period in question, it seemed fairly safe to apply the same coc:Eficient for 
::ill yP::1r!':. 
An independent estimate of the manufacturins paid labor share of gross value 
.added differs somewhat (on the lower side) from the nat:Lonal accounts figures 
presented here. My figure for 1960 was 31.!+ instead of the ne.tional accounts 
34. 9; for 1967 mine was 34. 0 instead of ?8. 9, In cor,1merce, the national accounts 
left unchanged up to 1968 the 18.3 percent estiraate coming from the 1954 com­
merce census; the 1967 census suggested a figure of 21.7 percent; its coverage, 
however, appeared to be less complete than tha.t of 1954, which might suggest a 
relativ2 upward bias in 1967, since the establishments miesed w;::re almost cer­
tainly disproportionately small sized ones" Any increase 
· · · presumably occurred gradu2lly over the yec,rs. This 
problem is relatively unimportant in the estimation of the total paid labor share. 
In other se-ctors it is Yery difficult to execute independent checks. In construc­
tion it is possible that -~·alue added :is ,mderestim.s.ted and the labo:r share over­
estimated) but it is not clear -whether by an inc::-eaoing or decreasing amount. 
Overall it appears that the national accounts .~stimates are well within the ball­
park after the adjustment made in agriculture; it -would, for cxan-;plc~ be very 
-24-
Sources and Methodology for Table 4 continued 
surprising if the figures were in error by more than 5 percent in the overall 
paid labor share figure. For purposes of comparison, Col. (15) presents the 
result of accepting the national accounts remuneration figure for agriculture; 
Col. (14) uses the author's estimates, i.e.~ it is consistent with all of the 
sectoral figures presented. 
Somewhat greater doubt attaches to the estimates of labor share of net 
domestic product sin~e the depreciation figures appear dubious; in the private 
sector they are probably biased up. but no calculation is made for public 
capital like roads, so the net bias is unclear. Th(, private sector upward 
bias may well have increased over time (as a share of G.D.P.), but so may the 
public sector downward bias. A guess would be that there has been a net increase 
in an upward bias over time, but this result is too speculative to make it worth­
while incorporating in_to the calcuL.i.tions. 
Col. (17) presents tl1e paid labor share of &.D.P. in non-agriculture. 
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average. The increased share of commerce worked in the opposite direction. The 
paid labor share for non-agriculture as a whole rose very substantially from just 
under 35 percent to about 45 percent. 
Jhe increase registered in the paid labor share for the period 1950-1969 
of over 6.5 percent of gross domestic product may, though it does not by any 
means necessarily, imply that the total labor share moved in the same direction. 
The increased number of large size firms and the gradual decrease in the rela­
tive importance of the family unit and of the unpaid worker (be he manager or 
family helper) tends, in some economies, to raise the paid labor share over 
time when the total labor share is not increasing; the former phenomenon (an 
increasing share of the labor force working for pay) does appear to have been 
occurring in Colombia--the share of paid workers rose from 55.4 percent in 1951 
1to about 58 percent in 1964 and about 60 percent in 1970 (see Table 5)--st~ll there 
is no decrease in the total labor share of private sector income--instead 
there is a 3-4 percent shift in the other direction (predictly less than the 
increase in the paid labor share). (See Table 6). As observed in Table 6b, 
the increase in the total labor share is small (less than 2 percent) when re-
lated to gross national income; given the uncertainty surrounding the deprecia­
tion figures, one cannot say conclusively that an increase has occurred; 
obviously the opposite cannot be said either. In either case it appears that 
the occupational position shift is responsible for much of the increase in the 
paid labor share. If the average imputed wage income of people not receiving 
1The 1970 figure may be somewhat overestimated since the Encuesta de Hogares 
appears to have underestimated the relative size of the agricultural labor force, 
where paid workers are a lower share of the total than in non-agriculture. On 
the other hand, of three alternative estimates available two put the figure 
above 60 percent. So, although it might be as low as 59 percent, 60 percent is 
perhaps a best estimate. 
Over the same years the share of the male population found in the categories 
"employers, independent workers, and family helpers 11 fell from 47.5 percent in 1951 to 
54.5 in 1964 to 40-41 percent in 1970; in the non-agricultural sector the decline 
was from 31.97~ in 1951 to 30.00 in 1964; a 1970 calculation is not yet available. 
'l 
Table 5 
Occt;.pational Position of the Economically Active Population (men and women); 
1951, 1964, and 1970 (percent distribution) 
Independent Family Independent Workers 
All Three and Family HelpersYear Employers Workers Hell?_ers 
1951 10.85 33.7425.00 8.74 44.59 
1964 3.30 25.34 8.31 41.95 33.65 
a b
1970 8.69b -:- 8.97a 22. 85~ ... 22. 87a 7.43 -8.53 39.27a-40.08b 30. 30a-31. 38b 
MEN ONLY 
1951 12.54 25.31 .9.63 47.48 34.94 









a, Authors calculations based on the apparent expansion coefficients implied by the ratio of the 
C1\ 
regional population totals estimated by DANE (in Encuesta de Hop.;ares, p. XIII) to t;1e size of sample 
(frcm the Encuesta tabulados). 
b. Also based on D.Al"\JE's Encuesta de Hogares; p_r_esented in Boletin l1ensual de Estadistica tl237, p. 77.
 
Sout ces: The 1951 and 1964 fi$ures ar,:: from the population censuses of these two years. In both case
s 
pen.ons whose occupational position was not reported were excluded. Two estimates are presented for 
totc:,1 labor force in 1970 due to the inconsistency between the figures deduced by the author and 
thoE,e presented by D.AJ.'1E. For men only, since DANE did not publish any estimate for the country as a 
whole, the only estimate available is that made by the author (a). 
-27,-
Table 6a 
Labor Share and Capital Shares of Net National Income at Factor Cost 
Capital In- Business
come of Savings & Private Public 
Persons & Un- Direct Taxes Sector Sector 
Paid Imputed Total incorporated of Incorpor- Capital Capital Total 
Year Labor Labor Labor EnterErises ated Entities Income Incomel Ca2ital 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6),:-. (7) (8) 
(4)+{5) 
1950 34.57 28.76 63.33 33.06 3.21 36.27 0.40 36.67 
1951 35.12 28.20 63.32 32.56 3.33 35.89 .79 36.68 
1952 34.55 28.76 63.31 32.80 3.15 35.95 .74 36.69 
1953 35.37 28.38 63.75 32.37 2.99 35.36 .89 36.25 
1954 34.53 28.82 63.35 32.60 3.35 35.95 .70 36.65 
1955 36.62 27.57 68.19 31.41 3.63 35.04 .77 35.81 
1956 35.44 28.33 63. 77 31.85 3.66 35.51 .72 36.23 
1957 35.67 28.10 63.77 31.48 4.06 35.54 .69 36.23 
29.45 4.81 34.26 .82 35.081958 37.78 26.53 64.31 
1959 37.55 26.37 63.92 29.71 5.44 35.15 .93 36.08 
1960 38.32 25.81 64.13 29.12 5.94 35.06 •81 35.-87 
1961 39.44 25.57 65.01 28.82 5.20 34.02 ,97 34.99 
1962 41.28 25.03 66.31 28.22 4.75 32.97 .72 33.69 
1963 42.28 24.20 66.48 27.51 5.63 33.14 .38 33.52 
28.13 5.73 33.86 .14 34.001964 40.24 25.76 66.00 
1965 40.54 25.09 65.63 28.23 5.73 34.01 .36 34.37 
1966 41.32 24.65 65.97 27.65 5.90 33.55 .48 34.03 
1967 42.41 24.42 00,0.) ,t;. f. '-t.:> .J •JI ..,,..., .nn....,...., 33.17,, nl'\ t'\.., /_ '\ C: C:"7 -:t'l .17 
27.35 5.70 33.05 .59 33.641968 41.79 24.57 66.36 
1969 43.68 23.36 67.04 26,17 6.28 32.45 .24 32.69 
Cuentas Nacionales for the paid labor estimates, except for agriculture. {SeeSource:
the discussion with Table4 ·). Imputed labor income was estimated as follows. The share 
of labor force in each of the categories employers, independent workers, white collar 
workers and blue collar workers was calculated for 1951, 1964, and 1970 based on popu­
lation census and sample information and was interpolated for the intervening years. 
(See Table A-4). Relative remunerationsfor the four categories were based on DANE's 
1970 Encuesta de Hogares and CEDE,Encuestas de Emplec y Desempleo, Annexe Estadistico. 
These two sources were not fully consistent and more faith was placed in the latter.
It wasThe same relative income ratios were assumed to hold for the whole period. 
assumed for employers and independent workers that 50 percent of their income was due 
to their labor input. (See Table A-6). 
1Defined as public corporation profits minus interest on the public debt. 
-28-
Table 6b 
Labor and Capital Shares of Gross National Income at Factor Cost 
Capital In- Business
come of Savings & Private Public 
Total Persons & Un- Direct Taxes Sector Sector 
TotalLabor incorporated on Incorpor- Capital Capital 
Year Share Enterprises ated Entities Income Income Ca:eital Share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1950 59.18 37.45 3.00 40.45 .37 40.82
41.201951 58.80 37.38 3.09 40.47 .73 
1952 58. 72 37.67 2.92 40.59 .69 41.28 
1953 59.20 37.19 2.78 39.97 .83 40.80 
1954 59.06 37.17 3.12 40.29 .65 40.94 
40.621955 59.38 36.55 3.36 39.91 • 71
.66 41.141956 58.85 37.10 3.38 40.48 
1957 57.46 38.26 3.66 41.92 .62 42.54 
1958 56.03 39.07 4.10 43.26 .71 43.97 
1959 56.47 38.50 4.81 43.31 .82 43.53 
42.771960 57.23 36.65 5.30 41.95 • 72 
.87 41.441961 58.56 35.89 4.68 40.57 
.65 40.191962 59.81 35.26 4.28 39.54 
1963 59. 78 34.82 5.06 39.88 • 34 
40.22 
1964 60.28 34.36 5.23 39.59 .13 39.7
2 
'11'1'-~ en "7, 'l/, e:,.Q 5.22 39.90 •33 40.23..,,J'"T• vvJ.':IOJ J-;J O, / 
.43 40.261966 59.74 34.49 5.34 39.83 
.15 39.171967 60.53 34.27 5.05 39.32 
1968 60.19 34.11 5.17 39.28 .53 
39.81 
1969 60.94 33.13 5. 71 38.84 .22 
39.06 
Sources and Methodology: Same as for Table 6a. 
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a paid wage is equal to that of those who are (an assumption not much different 
from that implicit in the figures of Table 6--see Table A-6), a shift of 4.5 
percent of the labor force from the unpaid category to the paid would (assuming 
also that the group which shifts receives an average level of wages) increase 
the paid wage share by 4.5 percent of total income. It would thus account for 
the bulk of the actually observed increase of 6-8 percent (depending on whether 
gross or net domestic product is the base). In fact the assumption that the 
imputed wage of the "group which shifts
111 be equal to the average wage of paid 
people is probably upward biased since this group involves in large measure 
farmers. At the same time it is true that the paid workers/labor force ratio 
rose more rapidly for men than in total; since men have higher wages and earn­
ings than women, this factor would work in the opposite direction. Even on 
the conservative assumption that their average income was one-half that of other 
paid workers, this factor would still account for on~-quarter to one-third of 
the observed increase; at the other extreme (if the G.D.P. figures are the more 
.i.111.;.1.1:::a::;1:::.relevant base) this shift could account for 75 percent or more of d1~ 
But though it is conceivable that little increase occurred in the total labor 
share, it seems very unlikely that this could have been the case in the non­
agricultural sector, the national accounts figures indicate an increase of the 
paid labor share between 1950 and 1969 of about 35 to 45 percent; the share ofnon-
agricultura~ workers receiving remuneration rose from about 68 percent to perhaps 
••• 'i ':,,.\•.•'.1.,.. •• • i~. .. 
71 percent. over this period, so unless the marginal group of independent workers 
1In fact, of course, it is possible that most of the change in the share of 
people who are paid occurs via retirements and entities to the labor force, 
and not by actual shifting. 
2
The figure was 70 percent in 1964; no estimate is yet available for 1970 
so the change of the previous period was extrapolated. 
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who in fact had 11 switchedn to employee status by 1964 were high in the income 
distribution, this switch could not be the sole factor. 
How has the distribution of total labor income as between that accruing to 
"pure" labor and that accruing to human capital changed over time? Unfortunately, 
estimating the pure labor share is difficult--even in conceptual terms--in an 
economy with such prevalence of imperfect labor markets as Colombia's. The con­
cept is perhaps more meaningful in agriculture, where a substantial portion of 
the labor force may have relatively little "human capital
11 but the exercise is 
worthwhile for the economy as a whole. One might guess, crudely, that in the 
period 1950-1969 the pure labor share in the system (according to precisely how 
one defines it and depending also on uncertainties .in statistical information
1 ) 
fell by about 7-9 percent. Perhaps the most interesting series--(Col. 1 of 
Table 7, i.e., where the pure wage rate is assumed to correspond to that of 
the agricultural male (over 18 years) 
2 , indica~es a decrease from 36 percent in 
1950 to 28 percent in 1969. (Splicing the earlier national accounts series onto 
the one used here permits the calculation of the ratio for 1945-1950, during 
'1
As explained in the methodology of Table 7, the key wage series used here 
are those of agricultural workers and unskilled construction workers. As ob­
served in Table 2 these two series bear a rather close relation to each other 
over time, and thus lend some mutual support to the relevance of each in measur­
ing the (more or less) equilibrium wage of groups with little human capital. It 
might be argued that since the two wage rates are not identical that either 
(a) construction workers have more human capital than agricultural workers in 
which case we have upward biased changes in the pure labor share over time, or 
that a labor market imperfection associated with imperfect labor mobility accounts 
for the differential--in which case the interpretation of the pure labor share 
becomes cloudier. These refinements cannot be handled without more information; 
of course there are other interpretations of the differential, e.g., cost of 
living differences. 
2 
Bogota street sweepers and other individuals occupied in jobs where minimum 
wage legislation can play a role cannot be used as a measure of the equilibrium 
pure labor wage, even though it is of course relevant that groups of people with 
no human capital may receive above equilibrium wage levels because of monopoly 
power or social legislation. 
.Table 7 
Factor Shares of Net Domestic Income: 1950-1969 
Pure Labor Share Human Ca£ital Share Total Labor Capital Paid Labor Pure Labor Share 
Year Est. 
1 
A Est. B2 Est. A Est. B 
Share Share . Share Agriculture Non-agriculture . 






1950 36.0 34.87 26.68 27.81 62.68 37.32 34.20 47.85 25.37 
1951 36.8 34.53 25.75 28.02 62.55 37.45 34.69 47. 77 24.52 
1952 34.4 33.11 28.32 29.61 62.72 37.28 34.23 43.68 24.75 
1953 32.8 31.36 30.37 31.81 63.17 36.83 35.05 41.91 23.28 
1954 31.6 29.90 31.30 33.00 62.90 36.10 34.29 38.49 22. 71 
1955 31.8 31.52 31.99 32.27 63.79 36.21 36.39 42.38 23.38 
1956 30.7 33.13 32.63 30.20 63.33 36.67 35.19 37.92 28.67 























1960 29. 8 33.74 33.46 29.52 63.26 36.74 37. 80 37.99 29.56 
I 
1961 30.l 34. 71 33.92 29.31 64.02 35.98 38.84 39.50 30.26 
1962 30.0 34.94 35.18 30 .·24 65.18 34.82 40.58 41.34 29.88 
1963 31.4 35.12 34.63 29.91 65.03 34.97 41.36 44.03 28.89 
1964 30.6 35.25 34.26 29.51 64.86 35.14 39.54 39.34 30.82 
1965 ;29.8 36.90 34.29 27. 59 64.49 35.51 39.84 39.91 33.04 
1966 30.1 35.36 34.54 29.28 64.64 35.36 40.49 40.14 30.63 
1967 29.1 34.21 36.52 31.21 65.42 34.58 41.52 38.75 29.58 
1968 27.24 32.26 37.49 32.45 64. 71 35.29 40.76 35.81 28.11 
1969 27.90 31.47 37.20 33.63 65.10 34.90 42.42 36.90 26.45 
1As noted above, net domestic product: (income) has been a decreasing share of gross domestic product 
(income) over time, according to the national accounts estimates; if those estimates are inaccurate the labor 
shares would ha~e risen less than indicated here, or possibly not at all (see Table 4). 
Sources and Methodology for Table 7. 
Estimate A is based on the assumption that pure labor income corresponded to the male agricultural 
wage, and that the days worked per y~ar were 250 for everyone. This procedure has at least one upward 
biasing feature, the assumption that~~ale wage be applied to women and children (who have lower wages) 
and to family helpers (who probably work on average considerably less than 250 days). A downward 
biasing feature is the assumption of 250 days worked for everyone; the average in urban areas is higher. 
For estimate B the above assumptions were applied only with respect to the agricultural labor force while 
the wage series for unskilled construction workers (of Table 2) was applied to the non-agricultural labor 
force, with the assumption of 275 days worked. Col. (5) 1 total labor share,is based on the summation of 
the paid labor income (Table 4) and imputed labor income, the latter calculated as 50 percent of total 
income of unpaid workers (employers and own-account workers). Col. (7), presented for purposes of 
comparison, 'is from Table 4. 
For Col. (8) it was assumed that net domestic income in agriculture was .95 times gross value added, 
and (different from Col. (1).) an adjustment was made (multiplication by the coefficient 0.92) to take 
account of the fact that unpaid family helpers work less than other members of the labor force and that 
women and children earn lower incomes (and hence presumably have lower inputs). 







which period, although fluctuating erratically,
1 it appears to have fallen a little. 
While there is substantial ruargin of error in these figures, 
2 a gradual downward 
trend from something which ffiight have been around 40 percent in the late 40s to 
something probably now well under 30 is hardly mistakable. It is of interest 
to note that the periods of rapid decline in this share have been, not surprisingly, 
those in which income per capita has grown most rapidly, i.e., 1945-1956 and 
1967-1969. Meanwhile the human capital share has risen considerably as an in­
creasing share of the population attains each level of education. This increase 
is concentrated in the two periods of rapid decrease in the pure labor share, 
although it continued to -,~ase up during the slow growth period, 1957-1966. 
Though there are suggestions of a decrease in the rate of Teturn to certain 
types of human capital over time (e.g., the decreasing ratio of white collar/ 
blue collar wages in indu3try) this factor, if present, has been outweighed by 
the other. 3 The total ?hysical capital share (i.e., '..:he complement of the total 
labor share) dcclinec: from about 37 pe:!'.-cent in 1950 to about 35 percent in 1969; 
1Probably due in part to the lower quality of the data in this period. 
2Note that there is some difficulty in the use of the national accounts 
income figures together with my independent estimates of employed population, 
which are generally greater than those used in the naUonal accounts estimates. 
Since some components of the national accounts are based on average income times 
number of people, such estimates would have been higher had the higher popula­
tion figures been used. This means that the figures presented here may over­
estimate the labor share at all points in time, assuming the national accounts 
use correct average income figures in all cases. The error implicit is not 
likely to be too great and the change in the bias over time even less. 
3The total labor share may be decomposed alternatively into the pure labor 
share, the primary education share, the secondary education share and the uni­
versity share; this alternative way of viewing changes mrer time may be of 
interest in terms of educational and other policies. 
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the share of net domestic product reaching the hands of individuals fell by about 
5 percent as business savings and direct taxes on corporations rose (see Table 6). 
Sectoral trends of the pure labor share are generally similar to those of 
the paid labor share. In agriculture the pure labor share, according to an 
estimate presented in a separate study, 1 was within the range 30 percent to 
36 percent in 1960, having fallen from somewhere in the range 43-50 in 1950. 
As of 1969 the range appeared to be about the same or a shade lower. In manu­
facturing one could argue that a minimum estimate of the return to human capital 
(i.e., the part not going to npure labor") would be the differential between 
the average earnings of workers in the larger firms and those in the smaller 
firms--the difference would be due either to human capital or to monopoly power 
of the laborers. Such a calculation would indicate that, as of 1964, this share 
was about 30 percent in factory manufacturing, i.e., about two-thirds of total 
labor income. 2 
For a full appreciation of changes in income shares of factors, one should 
treat capital appreciation as a form of income; usually its effects are not 
allowed for unless there is some marketability of the capital and are therefore 
not treated in the case of human capital. The ratio of appreciation of physi­
cal capital to other forms of income in the period in question has probably 
1 
See Albert Berry, 11 Land Distribution, Income Distribution and the Productive 
Efficiency of Colombian Agriculture," Growth Center Discussion Paper #108, 1971. 
2The average wage rate in 1964 was about 12.2 thousand pesos whereas the 
wage rate of the smallest size group was only about 4 thousand. Note that a 
good deal of this human capital share goes to white collar workers. The paid 
labor share of gross value added in 1964 was 38.l (see Table 4). This would be 
higher (say 42 percent) in the factory subsector. As a share of net value 
added, it would be say 46 percent. Inclusion of unpaid workers' labor income 
could raise it to 47 percent. Two-thirds of this is a little over 30 percent. 
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1
been in the range of 10-20 percent in Colombia. 
S,TI~.:r~s__ e.e a Function of Income and Wealth 
~v 
Regardless of the precise accuracy of the figures of Tables 6 and 7, it is 
clear tha~ the opportunity to save and to invest productively (in physical or human 
capital) is key to the possibility of achieving a high income level and hence an 
important determinant of the income distribution. Different savings theories sug­
gest different relationships between the wealth level, the income level, and the 
2
share of income saved in the short or long run. Unfortunately there is almost 
no evidence available on levels of wealth in Colombia and hence on its relation­
ship with other economic variables so nothing of a more than impressionistic 
nature can be said on this issue at present. 
There is, however, some information available on the relationship between 
savings rates and income levels. Very scattered evidence from the agricultural 
sector suggests that (at least in the mid SOs) the savings rate was a positive 
function of the income level, with a high marginal propensity to save over acer­
tain range of incomes and a lower but still positive marginal propensity for higher 
levels. It seems probable also that, for a given income level, the savings ratio 
is higher for individuals who own farms or who operate them for landless workers. 
3 
In the urban sector only two budget studies are available which per~it 
fairl7 direct comparison of savings rates across families of different income 
1A crude estimate by the author suggests a ratio of tangible wealth held by 
individuals to national income of about 4:1 in 1956. It seems probable that the 
real appreciation of these assets falls in the range 2-5 percent. This would 
imply an "appreciation income" equal to 8-20 percent of the regular "national 
accountc 11 income. The roughly half of the capital which corresponds to urban 
land and real estate (includ~ng houses) probably appreciates at close to the 
upper margin of the range set but some other assets may not tend to appreciate at 
all. (Appreciation of financial assets appears quite limited.) 
2rf the rate of return on capital is equal for everyone the pattern of 
savings will lead to an increasing concentration of wealth (and therefore of 
income from capital) over time, if the ratio "current savings/wealth" is an 
increasing function of wealth. 
"-, 
-see Albert Berry, "The Development •.• ," -2£.• cit., Chapter 3. 
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levels. The 1953 DANE study suggested a high marginal propensity to save, both 
1
for empleados and 0 breros. In the range of income up to 1,000 pesos per month, 
the marginal propensity to save appears to have been about 0.25 for both groups 
2 ' 3considering the income range where savings were positive. For reasons ex­
plained in Table 8, the marginal savings rate estimates are probably better 
than the average ones, which are probably upward biased. (See Table 8.) The 
second major budget study was carried out by CEDE in 1967; 4 a comparison with 
the 1953 results, though not fully possible due to differences in the sample 
base, does tend to reinforce those earlier results. 5 (See Table 8.) The strong 
association of the savings rate with the income level is quite clear, with the 
marginal propensity to save about 30 percent over the 5,000 to 20,000 (per three 
months) income range. Although the data as presented do not permit a fully ac­
curate calculation of the savings rate for various income groups, it seems clear 
that the annual family income at which the savings rF":e becomeR noi::dt1•·~ is about 
1About 5,500 per month in 1971 pesos, converted by an average of the national 
blue collar and white collar costs of living indices. 
2Inclusion of the negative savings ranges does not affect the estimates much. 
Abov.e 1,000 pesos for obreros and 1,500 for empleados estimates become more specu­
lative since the highest income category is open-ended. 
3 
we need not here go into the difficulties of interpretation of family budget 
studies nn a cross sectional basis. Many things may affect the savings of a given 
family in a given year besides current income, so it may be difficult to learn much 
from it with respect to the long run relationship between income and the savings rate. 
One theory, of course, is that the savings rate is essentially independent of the 
long run or "permanents income level. There is too little data in Colombia to test 
the validity of this contention. Although it is consistent with the low savings rates 
of low income white collar workers, many of whom are probably young and have permanent 
incomes well above over time data on total personal savings are too inaccurate to 
test for consistency with the cross section budget studies. 
4Rafael Prieto D., Estructura del Gasto y Distribucion del Ingreso Familiar en 
Cuatro Ciudades Colombianas 1967-68, CEDE, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogota,Mayo 1971. 
5The income level at which savings become positive appears to have risen some­
what between the two studies. The exclusion in 1953 of small families and own ac­
count workers biased its results down and statistical problems appear to have biased 
them up; the direction of the bias is therefore indeterminant; probably it is not 
too great. 
Table 8 
.The Savings Rate and Income Levels, 1953 and 1967/8.
(Income Levels Expressed jn 1953 ~esos)
1953 -------- 1967-8Seven Cities Four Largest Cities 1967-8 196 7-811lncome
Paid Paid Paid Blue Paid Paid 3 M""'tlo\Esti- Categories Estimated
Blue White & White Blue White mated Expressed 1967-8 Savings Rate
Monthly Collar Collar Collar Collar Collar Savings in 1953 3 Mon+~ (Using 1967-8
Income Workers Workers Workers Workers Tnu.fW!e.Workers Rate Pesos Per Mo. Categories Categories) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
~-so <83 0-999 -60.0-80.0
100-199 -1.8 -4.1 -2.0 -1.9 -30.0 83-166 1000-1999 -23.0-30.0
166-249 2000-2999 - 9.3
200-299 0.5 -15.5 -6.5 0.8 -15.5 -18.0 
300-399 4.5 -3.4 3.0 3.4 4.2 - 8.5 249-332 3000-3999 - 7.7
332-415 4000-4999 - 0.5
400-499 9.0 0.6 6.7 4.7 0.2 7.5 
500-599 15.] 9.9 14.0 14.0 10.1 7.0 415-581 5000-6999 8.5 wI....,
600-699 14.3 0.1 7.5 13.2 - 0.7 6.0 I581-749 7000-8999 5.8
700-799 21.2 7.4 13.l 19.9 6.4 8.0 
800-899 23.2 11.2 14.5 19.7 9.8 12.0 
900-999 19.2 13.4 14.9 19.2 13.5 15.0 747-1245 9000-14,999 20.0
1000-1499 26.7 28.3 28.1 24.6 27.7 20.0 1245-1660 15000-19999 18.0>1500 34.1 34.1 31. 6 24.0 716-60 .20,000 24.0 
llNote: All figures in Cols. (1) to (5) contain an upward bias whose overall magnitude is known byt whose
impact within each income category is not. Hence the figures have been presented here without .
correction for that bias. (See the discussion in "Sources and Methodology.") 
Sources and Methodology: Tal:>:t.e 8 
The comparison of s~vtn,gs rates between 1953 and 1967-8 is complicated by 
the different natures of th~·saJl!ptes,·:1,11 1:qe two yeaps. The four cities dealt with 
in 1967-8 were all covered in 195J a~ weii, but a basic problem is the non-random 
character of the 1953 sample. For a family to be included it had to be a complete 
family (mother, father and one or more children) or incomplete (one parent and at 
least one child, and at least one other adult) and with the further characteristic 
that at least one member of the family had to be a remunerated worker. A husband 
and wife with children not their own could be included. No families of less than 
three persons were included, and there were always, apparently, two or more 
adult$. (See DANE, Economia y Estadistica #85, 1958, p. 15.) The requirements 
o.f ~WQ a4Hl~~ do~s nqt come throµgh clearly in the discussion of requisites (£E.• 
ill,, p. 8} but the families listed all seE;!)l t:o have this characteristic. This 
sample appears to have been a random search for falltl:t,ies with the cited characteris­
tics. It is not clear whether, if the wife or child were rewunerated but not work­
ing full time this would satisfy the requirement; it seems unlikely, since the 
proportion of total income supplied by wives was extremely sma.il (al>qµt 1 percent) 
although in the case of children it was substantial (16.8 percent for empleados 
and 22 percent for obreros) see ibid, p. 65. Cols. (1) and (2) present weighted 
averages of the savings rates found in each city; the weights are the 1951 popu­
lations of the cities. (Better weights would have been the 1951 remunerated white 
collar and blue collar workers, but the population census and this sample did not 
use the same definitions, so this approach would be difficult, if not impossible}. 
Assuming that a random search was carried out for empleados and obreros, and 
apart from differential rates of rejection, they should have appeared :1.::1 the sample 
in about the same proportions as in the universe, so it should be appropriate to 
lump the two together in each city to get a single savings rate, and then apply 
the city weights just referred to. Col. (3) is. thus a weighted average of the 
figures of Cols. (1) and (2), weighted by the original relative sample sizes 
before rejections occurred. Cols. (4) ~ (5) present the same serie!s as (r) •and ..(2) 
:·b:u.t .fo·r ·the -4 largest· cities only, in an attempt toi gain greater :.co~::,P.-:,:!.;:,:l,,.'.;;)]!_ittl:y 
-with 1Jlrre .19,&7 / 8 data. 
The 1967-8 sample was not constrained; there was a stratification into high, 
medium, and low groups, but the blowup factor after the sample presumably was 
corrected for the use of different sampling ratios in these categories; the~e 
appear to have been no constraints for family size. Some of the tables and income 
expenditure comparisons include total expenditure and total incoµie, others dis­
posable income and expenditures excluding taxes and social security contributions. 
(In 1953 the treatment in this respect was different (in that income included 
credit as well as current income)--see the discussion below. 
Col. (6) presents a rough guess at the savings rate for the four city sample 
in 1967-8 with values interpolated to match the.1953 income categories. (Defla­
tion to 1953 pesos was by an average of the obrero and empleado nattonal cost 
of living indices. Col. (7) shows the monthly income brackets which correspond 
after deflation to the 1967-8 brackets (Col. 8). Col. (9) presents estimates of 
the 1967-8 savings ratios (corresponding to the categories of (Col. (8). These 
are only estimates as Prieto liEstructura~' .2£.· cit., did not present average 
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incomes of the categories and these had to be guessed at. 
The 1953 figures presented in Table 8 contain one upward bias in that the 
concepts used for income includes credits (seep. 55) while that for expenditure 
is on consumption exclusively. Credits bear an unknown ratio to current income~ 
since the study did not present them separately from what it considered to be 
unreported income (where total disbursements, carefully measured, exceeded total 
reported availability of funds). It was noted that this underreported income 
was small (p. 79) so it could be concluded on balance that credit accounted for 
from 2 to 25.7 percent of current income. On average its inclusion in the in­
come figures used as a base for Table 8 would bias the savings rate up by between 
zero and 2-3 points.At the same time cross checks revealed underreporting of 
income (p. 74) wheu the employervs statement was compared to that of the em­
ployee; since on the expenditure side it would seem as probable or more so that 
investment items or savings were missed (v~. consumer item~ this problem would 
constitute a downward bias in the savings rate. The net error probably lay 
in this direction as it seems implausible that in all of the cities the obreros 
could have negative savings rates (reaching 8 percent in Medellin)--the implica­
tion of accepting the figure at face value (seep. 78). 
Overall, it cannot even be concluded with certainty that the savings rates 
of Table 8 are upward biased, though it is more likely than not. 
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18,000 pesos, i.e., about 1,500 pesos per month. This implies that about 
55-60 percent of families in the sample are saving and about 40-45 percent dis­
saving. 
It is interesting to note that the dividing line between savers and dissavers 
appears to have risen, in fact the whole savings function appears to have 
shifted down. As noted above, the marginal propensity to save is high in both 
1cases, perhaps about the same level in each case. The higher dissaving rates 
corresponding to low income levels are very noticeable in 1967/8; this is due, 
presumably, to the higher long run average (or permanent) income, associated 
with the higher average income than in the earlier years. 
Average savings rates for the two universes were almost the same, 1.1 per­
cent in 1967/8 and perhaps a little higher in 1953. 2 The proximate explanation 
of the failure of the average rate to increase in the face of increasing in­
comes, is the overall downward shift of the whole savings function, especially 
3in the just mentioned dissaving range of the low income groups. 
1The calculated marginal propensity is somewhat greater in 1967/8 but the 
inclusion of own account workers (especially employers) would be expected to 
produce a higher marginal rate than in 1953 when they were excluded. 
2In 1953 the calcula.ted savings rates for empleados and obreros (with 
the by city rates weighted in each case by city populations) were 4.1 percent 
and -4.5 percent respectively. Weighting again by the relative importance 
of the income of each group, one arrives at a measured average savings rate 
of about zero. (There were about 2-. 5 times as many obreros but their average 
income was less than half as much). If own account workers had been included, 
it seems likely the average savings rate would be raised a few percent, at 
least. 
3It might be speculated that many of the members of those income cate­
gories which dissave should not be assumed to be permanent members of those 
categories. Either they had higher income before or expect to have it in 
the future. 
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Comparlsons between the two surveys should not be pushed far, however, due 
to the incomparibility of the sample base. It seems clear that a higher observed 
savings rate would have been expected in 1967-8 if no real change had occurred, 
due to the inclusion of small families not included in 1953, who tend to have 
high savings rates (26 percent in this study). Two-person families also have 
higher savings rates than any of the others. 1 Although it constitutes a bias, 
this is not an important problem; it can be seen in Table A-7 that if one and 
two person fa.milies were excludad~ the average expenditure income ratio could 
not be much above 0.995, say, A possibly more serious incomparability relates 
to the exclusion in 1953 of persons who did not work for a wage, It is generally 
observed that these people have higher savings than wage or salary earners, so 
it may be concluded, with little doubt, that the savings figures from 1953 are 
downward biased relative to the universe at that time, perhaps suBstantially: 2 
For this reason it does indeed appear fairly safe to conclude that the savings 
function has shifted down between the years in question, 3 though by how much 
4 ' 5remains to be seen. 
1rt is possible, of course, that one person and two person families have 
higher inccmes, but it seems more likely that this factor works in the other di­
rection. Such families do, of course, have higher per capita.incomes for a given 
family income no it would be very surprising if their savings ratio was not 
higher at a given family income level. 
2The impact of excluding families with non-remunerated workers in 1953 is 
harder to get at in quantitative terms. No statistics which would help to permit 
the necessary separation seem to be presented in the CEDE study. 
3This phenomenon is, of course, well documented in the developed countries. 
4Another factor which would have created incomparabilities between the two 
years is different "cyclical phases" of the urban economy,, But both years were 
in periods of rapid growth (although 1953 had more years of sustained growth 
before it than 1967-8) so it is not likely that too great a problem is involved. 
The issue would deserve further study, however. 
5One worry about the 1967-8 study is that whole cities showed up with negative 
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Of prime relevance to the theme of this paper is the long run relationship 
between income (and wealth) levels and savings. Unfortunately the data of 
Table 8 do not fulfill this need. As Friedman observed, an increasing propen­
sity to save observed in a budget study does not imply a long run difference in 
1the savings rates for the families involved. Further disaggregation, e.g., by 
income and occupation group would be helpful in ascertaining the degree to which 
transitory factors explain the increasing average propensity. The fact that 
higher occupational categories have higher savings rates suggests that long run 
differences do exist. (See Table A-8.) Prbfessionals and managers have a 
savings rate of 12.4 percent, empleados and sales personnel one of 3.3 percent, 
and obreros (in industry, construction aud transportation) one of about 3.0 per-
2cent. 
Forms of Wealth, Investment Opportunity, and the Rate of Return to Capital of 
Savers 
Colombia's markets for financial assets and for many forms of real wealth 
are quite imperfect, and it may logically be hypothesized that the rate of retum 
4savings rates. The average propensity to consume was 113.8 in Barranquilla, 
102.8 in Cali, 98.1 in Bogota and 89.3 in Medellin, with an average of 98.9. 
(Absolute consumption is highest in Bogota thennarranquilla, Cali and Medellin 
in that order.) Except for the top income category, Barranquilla has the highest 
spending in each categorys and in the lowest category, in particular, it is more 
than twice any of the other cities. Typically Bogota is second, Cali third and 
Medellin last. When a whole city, with presumably balanced representation of young 
dissavers, middle age savers, et. al is dissaving, it is strongly suggestive either 
of data problems or of some general transitory factor, such as that discussed in 
the previous footnote. Conceptually a city could be "subsidized" by other cities 
but for one the size of Barranquilla this explanation seems little plausible. 
1Milton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption FuncUon, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1957. 
2
Prieto, ££.· cit., parte I, p. 73. The figures presented here are slightly 
different from Prietos, being savings out of disposable rather than total income. 
The savings function for professionals and directors appears to lie below the 
overall savings function; Table 8 indicates that the typical savings rate for 
incomes in the 15,000-20,000 rEnge (where the average for this group falls) is 
18 percent. 
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to capital is on average higher for the large scale saver than tbe small scale 
one; this seems clearly to be true for transferred savings, but it is more dif­
ficult to substantiate overall since many small scale saverc who inveGt in their 
own enterprise, their own farm, or whatever, could conceivably b0 ea~ning high 
returns on this capital. Since both their labor and their capital incone is 
imputed, and it is necessary to separate the two in order to measure the rate 
1
of return to their capital, this turns out to be extre:nely d:!.fficult. 
A limited amount of information available on the forms of wealth in Colombia 
gives circumstantial evidence as to the distribution of wealth holding by people 
in different income categories. The major forms of physical c~pital are agri­
cultural land and other agricultural capital, urban land and buildb.gs, machinery 
and equipment in industry and other non-agriculture.I sectors; O!llallcr but still 
important categories are automobiles and consumer durables.Of the fin~ncial 
assets, the most important are industrial stocks, cash, life :i.r,surancc, r.1ort­
gage and capitalization cedulas, etc. Very crude estimates can be. mndc es to 
the total amount of wealth represented by some of these assets (see Tnblc 9) 
but there is to date insufficient information on the extent of: the "lnyerir..g" 
of these assets and on the extent to which non-individuals (e.g., produc:l.ng 
1
In fact, in situations where the total factor productivity of different 
economic units varies according to their size, there may be 110 them~<':!t"lcally 
determinable rate of return to either input or at least there r'".y or,:,_ .~.c ·• 
meaningful pair of rates such that their application to the qucnt~_t:y of each 
input .implies a total -factor remuneration which adds -·up to i.:he totaJ_ iP.co:ne 
of the individual. For a further discussion of this problem in the con-::.ext 
of agriculture see the author'$ "Land Distribution, Income Distribution and 
the Efficiency of Colombian Agriculture,11 op. cit., pp. 24, 25. 
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Table 9 
Some Crude Estimate Figures of Wealth Composition - 1952 and 1965 
(millions of current pesos) 
I. Tangible Assets 
Rural real estate (land, 
buildings, plantations) 
Cattle 
Urban real estate (land, buildings 
and capital) 
Non-agricultural capital equipment 
in private sector 
Of which corporations held 
Dwellings 
Automobiles, trucks, etc. 
Consumer durables 
Total Tangible Wealth 











* December 1964. 







































Sources: These data (except those taken from statistical sources) are designed 
only to give rough approximations; some might be in error by as much as 50 per­
cent. The data on financial assets comes usually from the Revista de la 
Superintendencia Bancaria. The estimates for tangible assets are the author's, 
based on a variety of sources and comparisons. 
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1corporations) control them. In terms of the present discussion, the matter of 
interest is the extent to which the various assets are and can be held by the 
small capital owner, and the rate of return he earns compared to the large one. 
With respect to some assets it is clear that there is a minimum feasible size 
which can be held, due to informational barriers, red tape, and so on. 
Tables A-9 through A-11 present scattered information on the distribution 
by size of some of the assets; this is summarized in Table 10. Of the physical 
2assets held by individuals, automobiles are probably the most highly concentrated, 
. 1 · -· . 
Some of the financial assets, of course, are essentially the proxy in 
the hands of individuals of productive capital owned by corporations. 
A check on the amount of real assets held, apart from non·•produced 
forms of capital, is provided by the nationel accounts; there exists one 
estimate or another over a long period of time~ and a summation of the net 
investment figures over the years provides a conceptually interesting esti­
mate of total produced capital. Unfortunately depreciation is very difficult 
to calculate so it is possible that the national accounts estimate is some­
what off the mark. Harburger has estimated capital stock over time with the 
same inclusions as those of Table 9. (See Arnold Harburger, "La Tasa de 
Rendimiento de Capital en Colombia" Revista de Planeacion y Desarrollo, 
Vol. 113, October 1969, · Cuadro 18)-.-Converting his estimate for 1965 to 
current prices by the GDP deflator produces a figure of about 220 billion 
pesos, in the middle of the range estimated in Table 9. This provides a 
certain amount of extra confidence in the data of Table 9. (The two estimates 
are entirely independent except for the land component.) 
Another check could be performed with data supplied in the income-wealth 
tax collection procedure; here individuals are requir~d to report their 
patrimony; even allowing for a considerable amount of underreporting, the 
figure would have some interest for purposes of consistency checking; such 
a calculation has not yet been made to my knowledge. 
2The top 12.4 percent of families
7 
with incomes above 15~000,accounted 
for 89.2 percent of expenditures on maintenance and operation of vehicles 
(not exclusively cars, but presumably almost), The top decile would appear 
to account for about 85 percent. The seconc decile accounts for about 9-10 
percent so that the two together account for almost 95 percent. 
It should be noted that the CEDE sample produced a remarkably high figure 
for expenditure on new vehicles in the income category 9,000-14,999; either 
this is an error or the purchase of new cars must be increasingly frequent 
in this middle-income bracket. (See Parte III, p, 14.) 
Table 10 





















Top decile 37.3a 
Top 2 deciles 53.oa 
Four Largest Cities 
85 55.0'.fop decile 38.4a 
Top 2 deciles 54.4a 95 71.5 
Colombia 
Top decile 0!48.zb 52.58 30.7 
Top 2 deciles 0!63.lb 66.83 43.4 
I 
*Note: Some of the figures in this table refer not to items held but items purchased during a given period; 
.p-
°'I
these two distributions are, of course, n,ot the same. 
a 
Prieto 9 .2.E.· cit., p. 157. 
bMiguel Urrutia y Clara EL:ia de Sandoval 11La Distribucion de Ingresos entre Los Perceptores de Renta en 
Colombia--1964, 11 Revista del Banco de la Re ublica, Julio, 1970. This dlstribution refers to the 
economically active population excluding family helpers)--unlike the distributions presented for Bogota 
and the four largest cities, which refer to families. 
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' bl h ' ' - land consume.,~ nura es rat,. er 1.1igh, 
A substautiaJ. ari,ouni: of tnve.stment--some of it probably yielding good 
returns-- occurs a.t present in th(.. fon1 of education, (see Table A-12); some 
is paid for by the public and sor.,e by families. 
As car. be seen (Col. 9 cf: Table A-12b) the distribution of total educa­
tional expend:i.tures is cons;"aderably less unequal than the distribution of income 
(see Urru::ia-·San,iff•rnl, Cuadro A-6) and heuce even less unequal than most of 
other forms of capital; 2 ~he ~op ~hize deciles while having about 73 percent of 
the income haw!, o.ccorcling to those figu:.:-es:, received the effects of only about 
54 percent of the educatiot,.al .~xpend:ttures. The bottom two deciles, according 
to these figu:r0s a,:-c th,? 1.mes which benefit most~ having only 2.8 percent of 
the income but /:.. 5 pe.::~ent of ·foe education. Note~ nowever, that these figures 
could be blar,ed up deper;.d1ng 011 how aci:urate the Urrutia-Sandoval assumptions 
1 
The top 12,4 perce:Jt CJf co1~smncr units in the four cities (trimestral 
incomes of 15 9 000 pesos and up) have perhaps 43.3 percent of disposable income, 
judging by the decile distribution (P.cieto, op. cit., Parte 1, p. 157). This 
group has 36.18 percent of expenditures (ibi"J; Part 1, p, 54 and Part III, 
p. 200). They have 55.1 percent cf durable consumer goods, as estimated by 
applying the expenditure coeffid.en':s by category (Part III, p. 13) to an esti­
mate of the dist:ribut:Lon of total e.xpenditures by income CA.tegory. Meanwhile 
the top roughly 8 percent (with t:cimes1.:ral incomes of 20,000 and up) have 
say, 33.6 percent of income (perhaps more), 27.76 of total consumption and 
purchase 63.23 percent of the durable consumer goods. 
Interpolating between these two sets of figures, it appears that the top 
decile must have about 74 percent of the durable goods purchases. 
The top t-:-m deciles hav,:~ nbout 54, l~ percent of disposable income (Parte I, 
p. 157) and the cutoff income is about 10,500 pesos. (Parte I, p. 138.) The 
roughly 7.6 p.r:3.:'cGnt o~ :::onsumcr units with incomes in the 10,500-15,000 pesos 
range has ::,bout 13 .1 percent of dispose.ble income~ a somewha.t lower percent 
of expenditures cn.d about 16,3 percent of consumer durable expenditures. Thus 
the top two decile<' c2c;:ount fo::: about 71.4 percent of consumer durable 
expenditures. 
2A comparison beti;,;·.=!en the cu-;:rent flow of educational expenditures by 
income a:ad the di.~tribvtion of so;:ne other fonn of wealth is not appropriate, 
however. The cu17;,nt d5.:-;t~~ibnt:!..:m of •~xis ting human capital due to education 
is prcsw-:::c1.bJ.;7 raor.::. unc:q_unl ·than tr:,;__: cur:r.ent flow" 
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are with respect to the share of rural population which does receive some 
primary education. Note that private expenditures on education are even more 
skewed than income distribution, tending to make up substantially for the ap­
parently positive redistributive impact of the public expenditures in this area. 
If it were not for the public education, the distribution of this form of 
capital might well be as skewed as that of other forms. 
It is interesting to note that, if our estimate of total education expendi­
ture in 1966 was accurate, (5.246 billion pesos) it compares rather favorably 
with the total physical investment for that year of 15.040 billion pesos. 
Part of the explanation of low private savings (when educational·expenditures 
are,inclutled in savings) at low income lavels may, of course, be the presence 
of public schools. And there may be some in-
divisibility involved in educational investment; if a family cannot produce the 
amount necessary for a semester or a year for the child, then it may be unable 
1to invest. The extent of inequality of the existing stock of education has 
been alluded to earlier; when measured in terms of years of education the top 
decile has percent and the Gini coefficient is when measured in 
terms of apparent income generating power (judging by wage differentials in 
Bogota 1963-66) the top decile has percent and the GIN! coefficient is 
Probably the true return to education is less than that implicit in these 
2latter fisures, so a true picture would be given by figures falling between 
the two sets just presented. 
1This is something of an exaggeration, since frequently different quality 
levels of education at different costs may be available; but this is not 
always the case. 
2See the argument as presented on p. 16, footnote 2. 
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Differences in the overall return to capital for people at different income 
and·wealth levels could Le due to different rates on the same assets, or to 
different access to groups or types of assets whose rates of return tend to be 
different. In the present context, the relevant concept of "return" involves 
capital gains as well as the income based on the current productivity of the 
asset. 
It is generally plausible to assume that real assets yield more than finan­
cial ones; the latt~r are 11 proxies" for real assets, and assuming the existence 
of transactions costs and "borrowers surplus" on the part of the entities emit­
ting the financial assets, the yield must be greater on the real assets. The 
conclusion that the average rate of return should be higher on real assets as 
a group than on financial assets as a group does not follow directly from this 
fact, however. If financial assets were emitted as proxies only for high 
yielding real capital, the 0pposite relationship could hold between the aver-
1ages; in fact, however, thi.s seems unlikely. 
Financial proxies for real capital owe their existence to the size of 
certain investment projects or firms and to the possibilities they (the assets) 
give of risk spreading (across different real investments). The existence of 
economies of scale in certain production processes suggests that the rate of 
return will be higher on larger blocks of real capital. And with respect to 
the financial capital, where large chunks of it are required, the transactions 
1Impressionistically one might guess that it is "middle yielding 11 real 
assets for which financial proxies appear. In the case of very high yielding 
ones, the operator of the enterprise may have a strong incentive to use as much 
of his own c&pital as possible, unless the capi.tal market is good enough to 
permit his borrowing at a more or less fixed rate and earning a high increment; 
in large capital markets this may be the case. Very low yielding real assets 
are not like:~y to generate financial proxies. 
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costs are substantially smaller if the corresponding financial asset has large 
denominations; otherwise it might be necessary to have more than one layer of 
financial assets to work up the necessary funds. 1 Another factor working in 
the same direction, perhaps with respect to both types of capital, is economies 
of scale for the investor--either the own investor or the financial investor. 
If one has very little capital, while the incentive effect may make him invest 
it carefully, it is difficult for him to acquire information on a wide variety 
of assets and he cannot risk certain ones, (in general he must be a risk averter); 
since the financial system reacts to all this, certain assets will not be at his 
dispoaal. 
The above conclusion is not a necessary one; there could be diseconomies of 
scale in certain production processes, and it could be too costly for large 
investors to undergo the transactions costs of lending to many separate pro­
ducers. In summary, the relative rates of return depend in part on (a) the 
prevalence of economies of scale in the system relative to (b) the distribution 
of capital between small savers and large savers. The theoretical case for a 
positive relation is less clear for real assets than for financial ones, partly 
for the reason just cited (diseconomies of scale) and partly due to other factors. 
In the case of assets utilized by the small scale (potential) saver and with 
respect to whose use he has little choice, i.e., if he does not own them he 
must r~nt--for example, dwellings, land if he is a farm operator--the trans­
action costs may make the rental price higher relative to the amount of capital 
involved than in the case of larger chunks of capital. As a result the rate 
11£ a factor like economies of scale in the basic production process were 
important, one might expect a certain parallel between real and financial 
capital in te:-ms of the relation of size and return. 
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of return to owning such an asset can be high for the small scale saver. Evidence 
of this does appear to hold in the case of housing, and the evidence from agri­
culture is not entirely contradictory to it, though it remains unclear. In the 
specific case of self-constructed housing, the evidence suggests that the rate of 
1
return may be in the range of 10-20 percent. 
One might anticipate a higher rate of return to investment on the part of 
small savers if their time rate of discount were considerably higher than that of 
richer persons. Each saver may be conceived of as having a decreasing "marginal 
productivity of· investment 11 function (where investment includes purchase of finan­
cial assets); other things being equal,the average and marginal returns will be 
a positive function of the alternatives open to a person and of his time rate of 
discount. (If it is high he will limit himself only to high yielding alternatives.) 
If this latter factor 1 
dominates, then the small savers' marginal investment will yield more than 
that of the large saver; this is not the same as saying that the iwt!rage savings 
yields more, however, though it would seem likely. (See below.) Possibly the 
situation for many small savers involves a very rapidly decreasing rate of return 
with the amount of investment; the high payoff items are ones like those just 
cited, where owning the item is a substitute for having to rent it since its use 
is inevitable; but after an individual has all the capital required to produce 
these services for himself and wishes to transfer savings elsewhere, the return 
falls off very sharply. For the large scale saver, since he does not constitute 
so big a problem as a borro~er as does the small one, the rate of return on 
"rent-substituting investments" would be less than for the small saver, but on 
savings transferred to others it will be greater; in short, his curve will be 
much more elastic. 
1A rough estim~te based on data from Planeacion Nacional. 
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The plausible hypothesis in Colo~bia would b~ that the rate of return on 
financial cssetd is~ generally incr~asing function of the &~o~nt of capital 
held for all 2.evels,1. while that on real assets i::: positive over a range above 
the wealth level at which the individual is using his capital to produce a 
2service for his own use; the relation for s1naller levels of weel th would be 
indeterminate. Perhaps the most striking difference in rates of rc·::urn is that 
3between the few financial instruments practically available to (or adopted by 
the small saver, i.e., liquid funds, savings deposits, and possibly a few 
government bonds--and the better yielding assets h•3J.d by larger savers (cedulas, 
4extra bank c:cedj_t instruments, certain stocks, etc.) Uany, i£ not most, of the 
"small scale" financiaJ assets typj_cally ea.:cn negative _::ates of return. 
The situation Jr: cloudier in the: case of real capital. Some information 
is available, aJ.beit crude <md :!icprel~:l.se, giving hints as to the relative rates 
of retu:rn to capita]. by size of. unit in the a3ricaltu::al and industd.al sectors. 
In the former the sL;e of unit is likely to rep1:·escnt directly the average 
1Perhaps the ouly possible e:-<ception would be related to small scale loan 
sharks (or, less pejoratively, 
1
'prestamistas), documented esp:2cially in rural 
areas. They loan smalI quantities at interest rates of 2-3 percent or more 
per month. Real r•~turn is exaggerated -by this figure of course, since eome 
losses occur, and transactions cost,s are high, But it seems unlikely, in any 
case, that many of these people are. in the low wealth category, even though 
they make s~all loans. 
2A substantial share of capital income may come from appreciation of assets. 
This form of :tncome is prooably quite conce:itrated? as it depends ::elatively 
more on connections, information, etc., than does incorr:13 from current production. 
3 
1 
Failure to tR.ke advantag., of some existing
. 
alternatives lo-;•~ers the small 
savers rate of -return further 9 Le., the low :-ate is only partly due to the 
absence of a.ltern2.tives. People who hold cash rather than the (less negatively 
yielding) savings deponi ts are a case in ~)oint; ,.mspicion and lack of familiarity 
are componeonts of th,::ir attitudes. The extent and determinants of such phenomena 
require much mo~e study" 
4
Although th<> ·~vi.denc0. remains limited, :Lt doe.s not appear that even these 
"large sc1ver11 •.,.ssets have really high ~:etu:cns in Colombia, apa:ct from the 
extra bank credit, 
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wealth (and income) of the owner. The relationship is less clear in the indus-
1trial sector, since some large units are widely held; as a result the distri-
bution of the capital income from them is a little more difficult to trace down. 
In agriculture the imputation problem creates serious difficulties, and the fact 
that most of the total value of the enterprises consists of non-reproducible 
capital makes the rate of return figure itself a difficult one to compare across 
size units. 2 
Table 11 presents alternative estimates of the relationship between capital 
income and the value of physical capital (including land valued at market prices 
as nearly as possible) in agriculture,(i.e., estimates of the rate of return 
to capital) 3 by farm size. The data is, unfortunately, not precise enough even 
to permit a conclusion that there is a generally positive or negative 
relationship between farm size and rate of return to capital. If the oppor­
tunity cost of the producer's labor were, for example, one half the aver-
age market value, then (for farms above two hectares) his rate of return of 
1
Though the share of all large scale sector real capital in the hands of small 
and medium stockholders appears low. Studies of the holding of corporate stocks 
suggest great concentrationo A study carried out by the Superintendencia de 
Sociedades Anonomas for 483 corporations in 1959 and 1960 indicated that the 
0.13 percent of stockholders (300-400 in absolute numbers) with most stocks held 
about 54 percent of the total value; but it appears that legal persons holding 
stocks (and at this time they held about 60 percent of all stocks) were included 
as stockholders--this procedure is not very meaningful; it is not clear how the 
result would have varied if only persons had been included. 
2
From our point of view here, the question of interest is whether the ratio 
"capital income/savings12 is higher for wealthy people or for poor people. The 
question is straightforward when the savings are used to purchase a capital good 
for a price determined by the production costs of that unit and presumably there­
fore in the long run relatively independent of the demand for it. But the issue 
becomes complicated when a high share of the capital is of non-reproducible form. 
An attempt can be made to estimate relative rates of return to savings as long 
as it is assumed that there are no changes in the relative price of land held in 
large farms to that held in small ones over time. This problem is not so severe 
in the case of industry although some part of the value of an enterprise is, of 
course, related to the intangj_ble and non--reproducible aspects of it. 
3No attempt was made to quantify human capital and the implicit assumption 
that it was proportional to physical capital -was used in these calculations. 
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Table 11 



























































*The rate of return to capital is defined as value added minus implicit labor cost 
all divided by value of capital (including land); it is an overestimate of the 
true rate of return since working capital has not been included. Further, human 
capital of the producer is disregarded; while this may not lead to extensive bias 
in comparisons across farm sizes (since human and physical capital might be 
fairly well correlated), it leads to an upward bias in this figure, viewed as a 
rate of return on physical capital. 
Estimate uses the "best estimate" physical capital series from Berry 
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capital would be larger than that of the large farmer, for most assumptions with 
respect to the relative amounts of capital; (alternative capital series were 
constructed due to the uncertainties of the data though only the "best esti­
mate11 series is used here). On the other hand, if the small farmers' opportunity 
cost of labor is the average market rate, or even well below it, the rate of 
return on farms up to two hectares is distinctly below that of all the other 
farm sizes. Overall, it seems clear that the relationship is not a monotonic 
one. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the figures is the rather strong 
suggestion that the rate of return does not vary much in either direction 
across the great majority of the size categories. 
Are Rate of Return Differentials Inevitable in Colombia? 
It is frequently argued (as noted above) that the difference between the 
rate of return on large and small units of capital is, in many sectors of the 
economy, a natural result of (a) economies of scale in the physical production 
process and (b) economies of scale in the financial intermediation system, these 
latter implying that even if all savings are aggregated to be invested in a 
large scale production unit, the rate of return paid to the small saver must be 
reduced by the greater cost of intermediation per dollar. It is intuitively 
clear that the second argument carries some validity, and generally accepted 
that there are economies of scale in various sectors of the economy, although 
the degree and pervasiveness of these remains to be ascertained. 
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It is equally clear, hov.·ever, that some of whatever difference may exist between 
the rate of return to the small saver and the large one is artificially intro­
duced by the nature of the capital markets and is not inevitable. An example 
is the savings deposits with their low real rate of return; the 4 percent paid 
1 on them is fixed by law; in general the absence of indexed bonds too must be 
attributed to institutional rather than underlying economic factors. 2 Avoidable 
market imperfections tending to create a rate of return differential in favor 
of the large unit are particularly obvious in terms of the distribution of 
public and private credit; it is perhaps more surprising that public credit 
tends to go (even for such institutions as the Caja Agraria, whose formal goal 
3is the financing of the smaller scale unit) to relatively high income persons ; 
quantification of this phenomenon is still meager but impressionistic evidence 
for both agriculture and the non·-agricultural sectors is strong. That import 
licenses go primari2.y to large firms is manifested in the unpublished statis­
tics of DANE which indicate that in 1964 26.6 percent of the raw materials used 
by the largest category of plants (200 workers and up) were imported while the 
1
Bonds with a readjustment clause guaranteeing that the principal retain 
its real value over time. 
2It might be argued that a major institution-based discriminating factor. 
is the inflation. It is responsible for the low real return on money and many 
financial assets, especially simple ones like savings accounts. Since the in­
flation is partly a result of rapid credit expansion--g6ing disproportionately to 
the large savers--its overall effect on the relative.return to capital of small 
savers is almost certainly negative~ possibly heavily so. 
3An institution like the Caja Agraria should not be ~lamed unduly for this, 
since in agriculture there is no way to give credit to the bottom deciles of 
the income distribution (with no or very little land) and there are always 
special problems in giving it to fairly small farms; a very special effort 
must be made, based on detailed knowledge of the cont ext; it is not easy. 
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corresponding ratio for plants with less than 15 workers was less than 
110 percent. Impressionistic evidence confirms the fact that not all of 
this differential is accounted for by factors other than the "nature of the 
market." The non-market element in the distribution of import licenses is 
also suggested by the particularly high share of imported raw materials used 
by plants located in Bogota (33.7% of all raw materials used in Bogota as 
compared with a ratio of 17. 8% for plants elsewhere; part of the differen­
tial may once again be considered as unrelated to market imperfections, 
e.g. on the grounds that for independent reasons Bosota's industrial 
growth coincided with a new emphasis on import intensive industries; when 
the 113ogota-rest of Colombia11 comparison is made at the two digit level, the 
relation is highly variable; though it is in considerable measure con­
sistent with that hypothesis, direct observation does suggest that import 
intensive industries have tended to concentrate in Bogota because of the 
greater ease of achieving import licenses there. 
It is difficult to judge the reaction which might be forthcomine 
from small savers (something relevant both for promotion of overall growth 
and for improvement in the income distribution) in the presence of better 
investment alternatives. It is interesting to observe that in the agricul­
tural sector the ratio of produced capital to the value of land appears to 
1Part of this differential corresponds to a different sectoral com­
position of the plants of different sizes, but the phenomenon in question 
is present within all or almost all two digit industrial sectors, and pro­
bably for any degree of desaggregation. It might be even more marked were 
it possible to do a parallel classification by size of firm rather th&n of 
plant. 
be higher on smaller farms than or1 lacger ones; 1 while this does not suggest 
that the smaller farmers have as high a savings rate as the larger ones 
(presumably the latter invest much of their savings outside agriculture) it 
does suggest in some absolute sense a willingness or desire to save and in­
vest, and difficulties in finding appropriate outside instruments. Con­
sistent with this is the low savings rate of landless workers in agriculture, 
Housing may present a phenomenon similar to this agri­
cultural one; a substantial share of very low income urban dwellers appear 
to own (or be acquiring) their homes in Bogota about 30% of families 
with monthly income below 1000 pesos in 1970 fall in this category. 2 
Differential Fertil,i!:y and Income_ Distribution Over Time 
At present fertility level differentials of families at different 
income levels are very marked; and may be a facto-r of some significance 
in the maintenance of a highly ske.ued income distribution. Table 12 presents 
guesstimates of the average implicit completad family size as a function of 
income using a recent fertility studyJ 3and rough guesses at in£ent mortality 
rates by income. The dat~ suggest that if these fertility rates remained 
applicable over time, urhan families with incomes above 12,000 pesos and 
rural families with incomes above 30,0004 pesos would have completed families 
1
Ao Berry? The Developmen.!:" • , • .£en _ill., Chapter 3. 
2 
see DANE,£:.~~Hoga~, 1970, tabulados. 
3See Ministerio de Salud y Ascofame, Hechos Demograficos, .QQ_• .£!!. 
4rt should be borne in mind that there was probably quite substan­
tial underestimation in incomes ic this study. 
- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TABLE - # 12 
Relati(?n Between Implicit Number of Children Born Over Fertile
Period, Family Income, and Rural Urban Location: 1965 
A. Urban Areas 
Income -t >3,600 3,600- ~000- 12,000-
6000 12,000 ao,ooo ~3o1eoo Total 
Age 
,I;,
of Hother Age Specific Birth Rates 
15-24 172.7 121..1 110.1 83.8 45.4 110.6 
25-34 237.4 267 .. 5 232.7 199.3 158.4 232.4 
35-44 138.3 131..1 144.0 72.8 52.2 116.5 
Implicit Total births 5.48.4 5.197 4.868 S.·?.6-9 ·2.560 4.595 
during fertile period1 
VIPossible Infant Deaths 2 1.346 0.9Hl 0.535 0.285 0.179 0.785 \.0 
I 
I 
Illustrative Implicit 3Completed family size 4.138 4.216 4.333 3.274 2.381 3.810 
Rural Age 
15!24 231.8 224.9 198.5 117.1 52.7 215.2
25-34 340.3 338.1 280.3 354.2 238.6 327.0
35-44 216.8 242.0 225.4 98.3 50.5 204.3
45-54 25.5 -· - - - 21.4Implicit Total Births
During Fertile Period 8.144 8.000 7.042 5.706 3.418 7.68.9
Possible Infant Deaths 2.972 l.9'-1-6 O.!H5 0.628 0.342 2.307
Illustrative Implicit
Completed Family Size 5.172 6.054 6.127 5.078 3.07'5 5,382 
1Assuming no mortaility, the figures here could under special circumstances, correspond to completed 
family size. The actu- al completed family size would be less than these figures indicate, partly 
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Table #12 Continued: 
due to mortaijty; also, of course, age specific rates change over time, so no real 
world pass through all the age brackets when the age specific rates were those 
shown here. 
2Infant morta. lity data was not studied in the Ministry of Health-Ascofame work 
cited above. Here we take note of the probable average mortality over the 0-15 
span, and assume that the level of this variable for the top income group ap­
proximates that of developed countries. The rest of the figures are guestimates. 
3An estimate of the surv.tvel ~ate· to age 15 is taken frcrn Enrique Pery S. 
Prey ecciones de la Poblacion Colombiana 1965-1985, CEDE, Universiaad de Los 
Andes, Bogota, Octubre, 1968, p. 19. We then assumeia death by age 15 about 
twice as high in rural as urban areas (30% vs 15.47%) and made arbitrary 
estimates of the relation between this coefficient and family income. The 
of course, constrained tocoefficients applied for each income category were, 
imply the overall infant death rates of each region. Implicit total births 
min~s estimated infant deaths. 
Sources: Ministerio de Salud-Ascofame, Hechos Demograficos, op. cit., Tabla 28. 
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(i.e. after infant mortality is taken into account) of about three children 
or less. Other urbnn groups would have completed size of 4-5 and other 
1
rural families of 5-6c The figures do not suggest much relation with 
size up to the 12,000 peso income level (though see footnote 1). The lack 
2 
of h a ' or 80 o o f e 1ation,· however, is notsue re.ation1 f or n5 percent t h popu · 
too relevant to the issue under consideration, since wealth is so concen-
trated in the top 10 or 15 percent, that the key question is whether that 
small group has a different .. fertility rate~ Here the average implicit 
size for the high income-low fertility categories is 3,03, while that for 
all the other categories together is 4. 55. And the roughly 40 percent of 
all families which are rural and have incomes below 6,000 pesos have 
average completed size of close to six; these people are quite low in the 
overall income distribution,. 
Since there is little data available to provide historical background 
on the differential fertility ~henomenon, it is not possible to ascertain 
v,Jhether the present implicit differential has existed for some time or not; 
some observers feel that it has not, and that the relatively small family 
size characterizing upper income groups now is a recent phenomenon; it is 
accordingly unclear whether in attempting to ascertain the historical rele­
vance of this phenomenon in perpetuating inequality, the current differentials 
1since the infant and child mortality estimates used here are 
guesstimates, the completed family size figures are subject to considerable 
erroro Probably what is least in doubt, however, are the rates for high in­
come families, and as long as these are reasonably accurate the differen­
tial just cited does hold, The relative completed size estimates for income 
levels up to 12 7 000 pesos are much more vulnerable3 
2
The three groups cited as having markedly lower implicit family 
sizes constitute about 12% of all families, 
3
A striking implication of the figures is that, within the income 
range where the great bulk of the population falls, a decreasing family size 
is not implicit in income increases, whereas it is implicit in the ::-·.:i.r~l 
to urban shift, Presumably a good part of the differential is related to 
different educational levels (at the same income level) between rural and 
urban, so this i~plication may not be relevant if rural education can be 
improved quic~ly; a doubtful point, 
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1could be assumed or not ; conceivably in earlier generations the very high 
infant and child mortality rate for lower income groups meant that the 
survival ratios and completed families sizes were rather similar across all 
income groups. 
To compare the importance of fertility differentials relative to 
such phenomena as differentials in the rate of return to capital and in 
savings rates in the perpetuation of inequality, several associated demo• 
graphic factors must be considered. One which can be fairly quickly dealt 
with is the e;rtent to which poor and rich families inter-marry, thus pro­
ducing a sort of "averaging out of we.alth11 phenomenon; it appears infrequent 
in the Colombian context. The nature of bequest must be considered in such 
an, analysis, in particular the exter-t to which wealth can be passed~bn to the 
next generation relative to that accumulated by the present one. Inheritaace 
taxes in Colombia probably take such a small proportion of total wealth 
passed from generation to generation that they can be ignored for the pur• 
. 2 
poses o f t he present ana1ysis. 
1scattered evidence from the thirties suggests that the completed 
family size of the working class was larger at that time. See .A. Berry, 
Breve Estudior de los Determinantes del Crecimento de la Poblacans en 
Colombia, CEDE, 1966. 
2As of the mid- siJ,ties, inheritance taxes constituted about 1.. 5 
percent of total tax revenue (excluding payments to social security), 0.2 
percent of national income·, and say 0.05 percent of estimated total 
privately held wealth. If we assume, crudely, that 3 percent of total 
privately held welath is being passed between generations in a given year 
then the ratio the i~heritance tax bears to this transferred wealth is 1.65 
percent. Although obviously crude, it is doubtful that this figure could be 
downward biased by a factor of more than 2 or 3; even if it were, one would 
conclude that an insignificant part of private wealth passed to the govern• 
ment during the inheritance process. (One bias in the above calculation 
may have been the implicit assumption that wealth holders do not run their 
wealth down significantly before death.) 
Summary 
It is now possible to trace out roughly some broad patterns of income 
distribution change over the last 40 years in Colombia. Evidence on labor 
income from wage series suggests a probable worsening of distribution from 
around 1940-when a number of the series began-until some time in the 50s, 
followed by an improvement until the mid 60s and a probable worsening again 
in the last five years. 
The labor share of income generated in the production process has risen 
marginally, while suffering 30me small fluctuations; the paid labor share 
has risen substantially, from about 32 percent of GDP in 1950 to about 
38.5 percent in 1969, but most of this is accounted for by a shift of workers 
from unpaid to paid categories. The increases in the labor share {both paid 
and total) have been stronger in the non-agricultural sector than for the 
total since the labor share fell in agriculture during this period. The 
pure labor share has fallen by perhaps 10 percentage points since 1945 and 
the human capital share has risf:n 6-10 points since 1950 to where it now sur-. 
passes the pure labor share as defined here. The physical capital share has 
fallen by perhaps 2-4 pointG since 1950, a.nd now represents about one-third 
of G.D.P. 
Factors determining these various movements are discussed in the text. 
It is interesting to note that labor income appear to have become less equal 
during periods of rapid growth (1940 to about 1955 and 1966 - present) and 
more equal during :1tagnation (1955-66). The first stages of rapid import 
substitution (1945-SSJ may have had a distribution worsening effect. The 
shift out of agriculture has probably had a positive effect~ especially in 
the last decade. Dif.fa~ential fertility rates presumably have some negative 
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impact but historical data are too sparse to guess at its magnitude. 
Differ.::-:::tial sa,.dngs rates have undoubtedly played an important role in 
maintaining a highly unequal distribution of capital. There is no evidence 
of significant changes in the impact of this phenomenon over time. (It is 
possible that a considerable part of both savings rate differentials and 
rate of return to capital differentials favoring high income and wealth per­
sons are due to capital market imperfections.) Public education has a clear 
positive effect in distribution of capital at present. 
Over the long run there is no evidence that distribution as measured 
by any single indicator (e.g., the Gini coefficient) has been improving or 
worsening. There is some evidence that the top 1-2 percent have lost over 
time~ and that the people in perhaps the second toufourth"deciles have been gain­
ing; some low income groups have gained relatively fast but it is not clear 
how the bottom two or three deciles have fared. This is clearly a priority 
issue for further research. 
• 
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TAB ·LE A - l 
Selc,cted Blue Collar (M,;,stly Unskilled) Dail)y "'!'9 !fates ()Yer Time
{Centavos Pex> Day) ' - · · 
Medellin: ~tr..: Cleaning Lady Unsklll.ed Unskilled Street Sw
eepex>s: 
Female \:Orkers. Unskilled Wox>ke~s, Ministry of Pl'!Yate Sector Public Sectox> 
Bogota
(Annual Income)
S-.?!1?,~tc.•J luJu~trlcs renicio.. factory finance Construction Construction Bogota Munici~al Employees
Workers: (~....) --noorman 0 H 1 We\I ,r•kor r-1• aervan,:Workers: Bogota,. (peoJ1e,s) ** Dogota ,.. Nominal Real Nominal NominalNominal Real
~om1nal Real*"' Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real (16) 
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (I\) ( 5) (6) (7) (8) .( 9) (10
) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
.l23 7042. 19J5 123 70
19.5 47 n.a, 70. 4730.5 ,. 14.25 140 70
2'1.25 20 50 1110 70
n.a. i 20 51 72 147 87
59 223l920 53.6 23 153 8722642.9 23 66 167 81
50 38542.8 23 167 Bl
!.5.9 45.9 45.9 
I
·so 23 54 ,731 405 183 n.a.
50.0 1,7. 7 44.7 ''89 23 64 , 753 366 183 110365192S 52. 5 46.8 49.8 79 62 ,682 183
83 75 , 757 361S6.S 36. 3 43. 7 200
69.S ~5.9 60.3 go 1.04 ,984 386 200
79. 5 !+9.l 66.7 104 1.06 l,024 411__.8.§..6 ___ 41.6 233
7t, .0 54.6 72.8 97 _ J..OL -2-so-
1930 - -67 .o - 69. r ll7:ll - 71:i- 99 ,957 n.a, 167
53.0 65.2 RO.O 70 104 l.153 470 233 83
4.5.0 80.3 86.S 63 106 161\,9 106 l.649 492 83233
50.9 76. 2 92.6 '12 lll 166,9 60 ,902 497 200 100
so.s 5~.2 65.6 ·,80 117 127,6 70 , 763 · 525 233 83 
1915 6 l. 7 63.3 75.6 113 121\ 129
,0 80 ,832 515 233 1.00
83.l 130 124,6 75 •719 559 IC70.0 65.6 110 267
137 136,2 ,924 50570.0 60. l 74.2 in 93 267
144 133,5 911 ,871 51270.2 55.3 £1 0 100 267






1940 115 30 26.18 160 13
9.6 95 • 829 l,166 267
30 26, 55 168 148,7 911 ,832 l,476 ff267
30 21\,1t3 92 ,791 l,605 
30 21,08 1,656 
40 20.114 
42,5 20.99 





















Table A-1 Continued: * Real prices of 1937.
** Real prices of 1923. 
Sources and Methodology 
Col (1) is from L~is Ospina Vas~u.e,, Industria y Proteccion en Colombia, 
Editorial Sante Fe Medellin 1955. . 
Col.s(3), (5), (7), (9), (11), (13), (15) and (16) are from Miguel Urrutia, 
"Estadistas de Salaries en Bogota, 1863-1933" in Miguel Urrutia and Mrio Arrubla, 
(editors), Compendio de Estadisticas Historicas de Colombia, Direccion de Divulgacion 
Nacional, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, 1970. 
Col. (17) is from DANE, Anuario General de Estcdistic~, various years. 
Deflation has been effected using for the most part food price series collected 
and published by the Banco de la Republica. In the case of Medellin (Col. 2) 
two series were available; a food price series by the Central Bank, used to 
c~lculate Col. 2a, and a white collar family cost of living series,used for 
Col. 2b. As can be seen, the two diverge very seriously. The Bogota series 
(Cols. 6, 8, and 10) were calculated using the Central Bank price series. 
It must be remembered that these were not a cost of living series, since equal 
weights were given to each of a selected set of items. 
TABLE A-2 
I 
Average Daily Wages in Construction (Excluding Fringe Benefits): First Semester of 1971 
(pesos) 
C I T Y MA E S T R 0 0 F F I C I A L H E L P E R 
Bogot.1 83.61 33.19 20.39 
Medellin 65.98 29.32 20.72 
Cali 103.60 41.60 20.64 
Barranquilla 69.16 33.84 25.49 
Cartagena 68.49 35.94 19.66 
Bucaramanga 76.19 28.27 18.55 I °' I °' 
Cucuta 63.50 33.18 18.6i 
.. - , Pasto 62.00 ·2s.20 14.64 
Manizales 53.58 26.37 14.91 
Neiva 94.86 35.94 18.71 
Promedio Total Nacional 74.10 32.29 19.23 
Source: Unpublished data of [DANE], c:ompiled by Jorge Rodriguez, of Planeaci6n Nacional. 
TABLE A • S 
CONSTRUCT I ·o N WAGES By SK ILL L E V E L 1 B O G O T A 
(Camacol) Robert Merrill
Pesos per day (1958 prices) ( 
)
Oficial 1st Oficial
Maestro Class 2a. Class Hel~er Helper Oficial Maestro(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




3.85 5.02 8.121955 4.11 5.44 . 9.34
5.29 5.43 9.68
4.87 6.90 13.59 0\
I
1958 17.10 9.85 8.15 5.60 5.01 9.87 22.4 
-..J
I1959 17.0l 9.80 8.09. 5.55 7.45 15.5 31.61960 17.50 10.06 8.31 5.69 15.7 21.0.. · ·1961 36.020.16b 10.97 8.06 6.13 16.0 21.6 36.41962 25.52b 11.52 8.89 6.57 16.l 22.l 36.91963 24.06 10.87 8.38 6.20 17.0 22.6 37.61964 25.13 11.35 8.77 6.48 17.6 23.3 38.31965 26.02b 10.84 10.12 8.92 18.5 24.2 39.01966 24.54 10.22 9.54 8.41 19.2 25.0 40.01967 24.98 10.45 9.71 8.56 19.2 25.6 41.5 
b) Years of known samplings. 
Sources: Worksheets made available by Robert Merrill (current pesos per day). 
-68-
'l' A B L E A - 5 




Collar Collar Account 
Workers Workers Workers EmElorers 
1950 38.48 22.04 27.38 12.10 
51 38.15 22.57 27.40 ll.88 
52 37.82 23.10 27.42 ll.66 
53 37.49 23.63 27.44 11.44 
54 37.16 24.16 27.46 11.22 
1955 36.83 24.69 27.47 11.01 
56 36.50 25.22 27.49 10.79 
57 36.17 25.75 27.51 10.57 
58 35.84 26.28 27.53 10.35 
59 35.51 26.81 27.54 10.14 
1960 35.18 27.34 27.56 9.22 
61 34.85 . 27 .87 27.58 9.70 
62 34.52 28.40 27.60 9.48 
63 34~20 28.93 27.61 9.26 











67 31.89 32.38 26.38 9.35 
68 31.23 33.35 25.96 9.46 
69 30.57 34.32 25.55 9.56 
1970 29.92 35.30 25.ll 9.67 
Sources and Methodology: Data for Table A-6. 
, . . 
-~ 
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TABLE. A• 6 
Incomes by Occupational Position1 1950-1970 
(Value Figures in Millions) 
(l) (2) (3) (11) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (lO) (ll) (12) 
Income of Per Capita Imputed Total 
Total Unpaid Income of J[.abor Total• Payments 
Independent Unpaid Workers Unpaid Income of .... ... remune- to Labor Labor Income Laboz, Income 
Employers# Workers# Earners II (Millions) Wor-kers Unpaid Wor-kers Ob,eros •· Empleados rados Per Paid Workez, Pu Obruo
2,661,8
l950· 3,938,5 1,969.3 
1951 3,898.08 9,075.82 12,973.90 4,320.5 3,330,1 :2, 160. 3 12,636.30 7,402,04 20,038.34 3,oz~. 6 1,509.11 918,98 
2 · 3,920.18 9,320,87 13,241.05 4,759,3 3,594.4 :2,379, 7 12,B51.i2 7,761.011 20,612.16 3,19•1,4 1,5119.B 1,001.23 
3 3,942,40 9,572,53 13,514,93 5,229,8 3,869,6 .2,614,9 13,069.59 • B,137,45 21,207,04 3,626,8 1,710.2 l,O!l7.27 
4 3,964,76 9;030,98 13,795.74 6,303,6 4,569.2 3,151.8 13,291,77 8,532,12 21,823,89 4,l!lO,l 1,920,0 1,223.48 
5 3,987.24 10,096,43 14,083,69 6,215.5 4,413,3 3,107,8 13,517.73 8,945,92 22,463,65 4,560,0 2,029,9 l,28'+.83 
4,957.21956 •1,00ll,85 10,369,03 14,378.88 7,208,5 5,013.3 3,604.3 13,747.53 9,379,80 23,127.33 2,143.4 1,347.71 
7 4,032.59 10,648,99 111,681.58 8,365,0 5,697.6 4,182.5 13,981,24 9,834,72 23,815,96 5,811.5 2,440,2 1,521,89 
8 4,055,45 10,936.52 14, 9Ql. 97 8,743,8 5,832.3 4,371.9 14,818,92 10,311.70 24,530,62 6,007.
9 2,'175,3 1,722.29 
9 4,078.45 11,231.80 15,310,25 10,163,4 6,638,3 5,081.7 14,.460.64 10,811.02 25,272.46 7,880.
0 3,118,0 1,922.79 
60 4,101.57 11,535,06 15,636,63 11,408,2 7,295.8 5,704.1 14,706,47 11,336.20 26,042.67 9,202,
0 3,533,4 2,165,21 
196! 4,124.82 11,846,51 15,971.33 13,026,3 8,156.1 6,513,2 14,956,48 11,886,00 26,842.48 10,874.
8 4,051,3 2,467,00 
2 4,1'18,21 12,166,36 • 16,314,57 111,427 .o 8,843.0 7,213.5 15,210.74 l2,462,47 27,673.21 12,016.0
 4,631,2 2,803,39 
3 4,171.73 12,494.85 1,666.58 17,619.9 10,572.0 8,810,0 15,469.32 13,066.90 28,536,22 16,
595.6 5,815,6 3,498,71+
11,679,8 15,725·, 72 13,677.17 · 29,•102. 89 19,324.0 6,572.1 3,930.21.. 4,108.82 12,830,97 17,029.79 23,359.6 13,717.0
5. 4,222.63 13,177,41 17,1I00,011 25,586,9 14,?0S.l 12,793.5 15,993,06 14,340.51 30,333.57 22,3
00, 8 7,351.9 4 ,311'/. 92 
1966 4 ,2116. 57 17,779.77 29,753.9 16,734.7 14,877.0 16,264,911 15,036,03 31,300,97 26,
753,9 8,547.3 4,999.59 
1 4,270.65 18,169.24 33,382,7 18,373.2 J.6,691.4 16,541.14 15,765.27 32,306,41 31,
049,3 9,610.9 5,562,19 
B 4, 2')11. B6 18,~C0,71 38,635,3 20,006,7 J.9,317.7 16,822.65 16,529.89 33,352,54 35,0
114, 7 10,50'/,4 6,017,61+






























Table A-6 Continued: 
Sources and Methodology: , 
Cols. (1) and (2), are based on the population census of 1951 and 1964 and DANES 
Encuesta de Hogares 1970, which provide estimates of those three years. Intervening 
years estimates were produced by interpolation. Some adjustments were made to take 
account of censal underenumeration; in particular, we adjusted 1951 figures for 
employees up by one percent and those for obreros and independent workers by two 
percent; the objective was to obtain the same remaining degree of under (or over) 
enumeration in the two cases; 1970 figures were designed to imply a labor force 
growth ra~e over 1964-70 in accord with the judgment of demographers. 
Col. (4) is the national accounts category "income of family units and 
non-incorporated enterprises". It constitutes, conceptually an overestimate of 
the income of unpaid workers, since some of it accrues to people listed as paid 
workers. 
Col. (6), one half of Col. (S),in__porporates the assumption that one half of 
the income of unpaid workers was imputed labor income. (Taking into account the bias 
just cited to Col. (4)J the implicit assumption really is that more than half of the 
income of this group is from labor). 
· Col,. (7) to (13) have sources symmetical to those of Col. (l)-(6). 
Col. (10) is from the national accounts and may, therefore, for reasons explaned 
elsewhere (See Table 4) constitute an upward biased estimate. 
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T A B L E A ~ 7 
Expenditure/Income Ratios by Family Size, Four Cities: 1967 
1.967 
Family Sj.ze Expenditure/Income Ratio 
l Person 74.0 
2 Persons 92.0 
3-5 Persons .;, 98.l 
6..8 Persons 101.6 
9 61". more Persons. 98.2 
TOTAL 98.9 
FUENTE: Prieto, Estructura •••• op. cit., Parte Prirne.ra., p. 63. 
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T A B L E A - B 
Estimates of the distribution of Urban Occupied Dwellings: 
/'Ir,,'{ 
0 W NE D RENTER TOT AL 
693,883 497,674 90,044 1,281,601 
Perc.e.t\ t 54.14 38.83 7.03 100.00 
11usually the residents are caretakers, have the dwelling in fidecornisio, or 
some such arrangement. 
-
--
... _..., ...•..,,, •. ...... 
TABLE A-12a 
Distribution of Private Investment in Education by Income Levels: 
Four Largest Cities: 1967-8 
(Values expressed in 1966 pesos) 0,-;,;nr.1 Oc...h:1..Ocdi~ Ar.t;ic..st..t to Dec.ale. e... s,s 
Decile Three Share of Share of Tl.re-. Share of/lfnthly · (bottom Percent Monthly Annual Expenditure Income Fo...,,ly Expenditure 
to of To-ht.l Family Personal Going to pen Income Going to 
top) Income Incomeb Incomer. Education on Education Level Education 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 1.9 0-883 0-2208 2.9 4.28 0-999 2.9 
2 3.0 883-1767 2208-4160 1.4 2.00 1000-1999 1.4 
3 3.9 1767-2652 4160-6632 2.4 2.76 2000-2900 2.4 
4 4.7 2652-3536 6632-8840 3.7 4.28 3000-3999 3.7 
5 5,8 3536-4420 8840-11052 4.1 3,69 4000-4999 4.1 ....,I 
I,) 
6 7.0 4420-6189 11052-15,472 4.5 3.94 I 5000-6999 4.5 
I 
7 8.5 6189-7957 15,472-19,892 5.5 5.32 I 7000-8999 5,5 
8 10.8 7957-13262 19,892-33,148 5.8 5.55 I 9000-14999 5.8 
9 16.0 13,262-17680 33,148~44,200 6.6 5.71 15000-19999 6,6 
10 39.4 ~17,680 ?44,200 7.5 5.62-6,00a 20,000 7.5~ 
Total 100.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 
8Assuming alternative savings rates of ,20 and .25; since this income category was open ended (no 
average income figures were provided) the estimation of the average income involves a higher possible 
error than in the other categories, · · 
b
Assuming a price increase of 10% betv1eEm _the two Y.~~r._s_..,_{the GNI __ 
. 1£lator rose by 10%, the. GDP deflator by 8.9% and that of private consumption by 9.6%} SIii conversion 
CED data to 1966 requires deflation by 1. 131, since it refers to the period May 1967 to May 1968. 




Sources and Methodology for Table A-120.. 
The data of Col. (1) are from Prieto "Estructura••• ", .££.• cit. Col. (2)_; the income 
categories from Prieto have been converted from the 1967 pesos in which they were originally 
presented to 1966 pesos (see Footnote b). 
Col. (3) was based on Col. (2) and the assumption that there were 1.6 persons per family, based 
on the 1964 population census data. 
Cols. (4) and (5) were estimated by interpolation to convert the expenditure data from the income 
categories used by Prieto to the decile breakdown use here. 
Col. (6) is the income classification used by Prieto and Col. (7) shows the share of all expenditures 










Clothing & Footwear 
Wood (excl. furniture) 
Wood furniture & 
accessories 
Paper & Paper Products 
Publishinij & related 
, industries 
•Leather (cxcl. footwear) 
Rubbc·r goods 
Chemical products 




·Basic Metal Industries; 
Metal products (excl. 






















T A B L E A - 1 3 









































































































































































l,165,6 18. 74. 





24,540.2 21, 1t3 
I ...... 
\JI 
130,5Elcc:Lric machi.neI· ry +
related artic es 266,4Trans1·,o r q1 tlon 
·mat.!l'lU.!S 
112.5 . Other: lllclllllfacturing 
.. i:1d us tries 1,904.4 ..... () I I! 
Source: DANE Irnh1stria Mnnuf11ct11rer." N::ic:ion;c1l l9fiR. I 
